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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt for a valid conviction.  The Constitution nowhere 
explicitly contains this requirement, but the Supreme Court in In re 
Winship
1
 stated that due process commands it.
2
  Justice Brennan, 
writing for the Court, noted that the Court had often assumed that the 
standard existed,
3
 that it played a central role in American criminal 
justice by lessening the chances of mistaken convictions,
4
 and that it 
was essential for instilling community respect in criminal enforce-
ment.
5
  The reasonable doubt standard is fundamental because it 
makes guilty verdicts more difficult.  As Winship said, the require-
ment “protects the accused against conviction . . . .”6   
Justice Harlan’s eloquent concurring opinion in Winship elabo-
rated by noting that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to 
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our socie-
ty thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for 
  
 1. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 2. See id. at 364 (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”); see also Victor 
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt every element of a charged offense.”). 
 3. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (“Expressions in many opinions of this 
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge be-
yond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”). 
 4. See id. at 363 (“The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the Amer-
ican scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error.”). 
 5. See id. at 364 (“[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to 
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the 
criminal law.”). 
 6. Id. at 364. 
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a particular type of adjudication.”7  Incorrect factual conclusions can 
lead either to the acquittal of a guilty person or the conviction of an 
innocent one.  “Because the standard of proof affects the compara-
tive frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice 
of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, 
in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social 
disutility of each.”8  Society views the harm of convicting the inno-
cent as much greater than that of acquitting the guilty.  Thus, Harlan 
concluded, “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in a criminal cased as bottomed on a fundamental value de-
termination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free.”9 
The reasonable doubt standard was constitutionalized because of 
the societal function it now serves.  Winship did not find it constitu-
tionally required because the original meaning of a constitutional 
provision required it.  Indeed, the Court indicated that the standard 
had not fully crystalized until after the Constitution was adopted.
10
  
Even so, the reasonable doubt standard provides a fertile field for 
examining the methodology of finding the original meaning of con-
stitutional criminal procedure rights.  First, its status seems secure.  
  
 7. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 8. Id. at 371. 
 9. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372. 
 10. See id. at 361 (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Na-
tion.”); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972), where Justice 
White, writing for the plurality stated, “As the Court noted in the Winship case, 
the rule requiring proof of crime beyond a reasonable doubt did not crystallize in 
this country until after the Constitution was adopted.”  White continued that schol-
ars had concluded that  
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt first crystallized in 
the case of Rex v. Finny, a high treason case tried in Dublin in 1798 . . . . 
Confusion about the rule persisted in the United States in the early 19
th
 
century . . . ; it was only in the latter half of the century . . . that American 
courts began applying it in its modern form in criminal cases. 
Id. at 412 n. 6; see also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 8 (1994) (noting that 
the 1850 formulation of the standard by Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw in 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), “is representative of 
the time when American courts began applying [the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard] in its modern form in criminal cases.”) (quotations omitted). 
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No debate questions the constitutional requirement that an accused 
can only be convicted if the crime is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Its original meaning can be explored uncolored by the parti-
sanship often engendered when present seekers of original meaning 
hope to define a new contour to a constitutional guarantee. 
Furthermore, serious scholars have studied the reasonable doubt 
standard’s early development and its original meaning, purposes, and 
intent.  An examination of those scholarly sources, methods, and 
conclusions provides a number of valuable insights that should affect 
the search for finding the original meaning of other American crimi-
nal procedure guarantees.  These are first that the seeker of original 
meaning of evolved criminal procedure rights has to go beyond tra-
ditional legal sources and explore the broader epistemological devel-
opments in religion, philosophy, and science that affected the devel-
opment of the right.  Second, conclusions about original meaning 
drawn primarily from English and other European sources can be 
misleading without a consideration of American developments.  
What might seem like a sound conclusion when English sources are 
examined may look suspect when viewed in the light of American 
developments.  Finally, the reasonable doubt scholarship reveals that 
definitive conclusions about the original meaning of American con-
stitutional rights will often be impossible to find both because the 
necessary American record is absent and because evolved rights 
never really had a definitive original meaning.   
The starting point here is with the scholars who have concluded 
that the original purpose of the reasonable doubt standard was not, as 
the Court now has it, to protect the accused, but instead emerged to 
make convictions easier. 
II. REASONABLE DOUBT AS A REPLACEMENT FOR ANY DOUBT 
Anthony Morano’s path-breaking article in 1975 maintained that 
the reasonable doubt requirement emerged not as a protection for the 
accused, but to make it easier for prosecutors to get convictions.
11
  
He concluded that juries were not instructed about a burden of per-
  
 11. Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable 
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975). 
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suasion until the seventeenth century, with courts then usually stat-
ing that jurors should convict only if they were satisfied in their con-
sciences that the accused was guilty.  Although Morano did not point 
to any authoritative explication of the term, he speculated that the 
satisfied conscience test  
 
probably required jurors to vote for acquittal if they en-
tertained any doubt.  It implied that, unless they were 
morally certain of the correctness of a guilty verdict, 
they would violate their oath if they failed to acquit.  It 
is probable that moral certainty was defined during this 
period as requiring proof beyond any doubt.12 
 
The eighteenth century produced no uniform instruction about 
the burden of persuasion, but most frequently, Morano maintained, 
judges stated that jurors should acquit “if they had any doubt of the 
accused’s guilt.”13  This was not a new standard but only “crystal-
lized the standard of persuasion that had been applied in English 
criminal trials for centuries.”14  And this burden, he stressed, “did 
not require that a doubt be ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ to be a sufficient 
basis for an acquittal.”15 
English philosophers of the late seventeenth century, however, 
realized that absolute certainty was not attainable in various human 
endeavors but that “moral certainty” could be reached about these 
matters.  This “required only that one have no reasonable doubts 
about one’s beliefs.”16  Furthermore, because the law began both to 
limit the evidence that prosecutors could present and to allow crimi-
nal defendants to present more evidence, it became harder for the 
prosecutor “to overcome a juror’s irrational or fanciful doubts. . . . 
One way to minimize this [defense] advantage . . . was to reduce the 
degree of certainty necessary to justify a guilty verdict.”17  As a re-
sult of these intellectual and legal developments, the reasonable 
  
 12. Id. at 512. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 513. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Morano, supra note 11, at 514–15. 
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doubt standard replaced the any doubt rule.  Morano maintained 
“that the reasonable doubt rule was actually a prosecutorial innova-
tion that had the effect of decreasing the burden of proof in criminal 
cases.  Prior to the rule’s adoption, juries were expected to acquit if 
they had any doubts—reasonable or unreasonable—of the accused’s 
guilt.”18 
Morano also challenged the conventional history on the stand-
ard’s earliest appearance. That history then had the rule’s first articu-
lation in a series of treason trials in Dublin in 1798.
19
  Morano, how-
ever, not only found reasonable doubt charged a generation earlier, 
but across the Atlantic “in the famous Boston Massacre Trials of 
1770–Rex v. Preston and Rex v. Wemms.  There is reason to believe 
that Wemms was the first case to specifically and purposefully dis-
tinguish between the any doubt and the reasonable doubt standards 
of persuasion.”20 
Since Morano wrote, scholars have found that English courts as 
early as the 1780s instructed juries about reasonable doubt,
21
 but the 
Boston Massacre trials remain the first known legal use of the stand-
ard.  Whether the Massachusetts court was truly the first to articulate 
it, however, cannot be known.  Sources for what happened in eight-
eenth century English courts are limited,
22
 and we know even less 
about what occurred in American proceedings.  In eighteenth century 
America, cases were not regularly reported.  Trial transcripts were 
  
 18. Id. at 508; see also id. at 515 (“[I]t is clear that the rule helped to reduce the 
potential for irrational acquittals and to that extent operated to the prosecution’s 
advantage.”).  But see id. (“It is not clear whether judges and prosecutors were 
actually aware of the prosecutorial benefits of the reasonable doubt rule as con-
trasted with the any doubt test.”). 
 19. Morano writes that an article by Judge May is the source for the conventional 
view.  May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal 
Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642 (1876).  This assertion was influential, for, as Morano 
notes, “[b]oth Dean Wigmore and Dean McCormick accepted Judge May’s thesis.  
The United States Supreme Court referred to Judge May’s theory in Apodaca v. 
Oregon.” Morano supra note 11, at 515 (citing Apodaco, 406 U.S. at 412 n. 6; 9 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed. 1940); C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 341 
(2d ed. 1972)). 
 20. Morano, supra note 11, at 516.  
 21. See WHITMAN, infra note 27 and accompanying text at note 39.  
 22. See Gallanis, infra note 49 and accompanying text at note 54. 
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  Furthermore, the avenues of appellate review of 
criminal convictions in early America were constrained
24
 and, thus, 




The available historical record, however, does find that the first 
use of the reasonable doubt standard was in the 1770 Boston trial.  
This has great importance in considering the origins of the rule.  It 
means that we cannot presuppose that America simply inherited the 
standard from English law.
26
  We have to consider the possibility 
  
 23. See Morano, supra note 11, at 520 (“One obstacle is the general lack of ex-
tant trial transcripts from 1750 to 1830.  Another problem is that the trial court 
proceedings in many criminal cases were never recorded.”). 
 24. Id. at 526 (“The avenues for appellate review of convictions were severely 
restricted in early America because the English appellate procedures, which the 
colonies inherited upon independence, were themselves very limited.  For exam-
ple, the writ of error, although generally employed in early America, provided a 
means for reviewing neither the sufficiency of the evidence nor the correctness of 
the trial judge’s instructions.  The bill of exceptions, which was the proper proce-
dure for obtaining review of such matters [sic] was not recognized in English crim-
inal law or in the federal courts of the United States.  It was not available in Amer-
ica until it was established by state statutes.  In some states, appeals from convic-
tions were virtually nonexistent.”)  
 25. See id. at 520 (“[O]ne must often search for jury instructions in criminal 
apellate reports.  These reports often do not reproduce the instructions or even 
allude to them. . . . Moreover, very few appellate courts directly considered 
whether the reasonable doubt standard had to be charged in all criminal cases.”). 
 26. The development of the reasonable doubt standard in America may have 
influenced its emergence elsewhere.  English interest in the Boston Massacre trials 
was high.  HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 300 (1970) (“In England, 
the Massacre and its aftermath had attracted wide attention.  Even before word of 
the soldiers’ acquittals had reached home, a demand had built up for information 
about Preston’s trial.  One bookseller said that if he had a report of the testimony, 
he ‘could soon sell a thousand copies of it.’”).  Certainly, the trial’s participants 
thought that the proceedings would get a wide audience.  For example, in the 
Wemms case, defense attorney Josiah Quincy in his opening statement urged the 
jury to be dispassionate and said, “We must steel ourselves against passions, 
which contaminate the fountain of justice.  We ought to recollect, that our present 
decisions will be scann’d, perhaps thro’ all Europe.”  3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 166 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, ed. 1965) [hereinafter ADAMS 
PAPERS].  A report of the proceedings was published in 1771, and it quickly be-
came available in both the colonies and England.  See Morano, supra note 11, at 
518–19; ADAMS PAPERS, at 38 n. 70.  This widespread availability, coupled with 
the fact that the reasonable doubt standard emerged at almost the same time in far 
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that it developed in America before it did in England; indeed, the 
available historical record indicates precisely that.  Consequently, we 
cannot assume that if we understand the origins of the English stand-
ard, we truly understand the original meanings and purposes of the 
American one.  It is, of course, possible that similar currents in both 
places produced the standard in each.  If so, understanding the de-
velopment of the English standard aids in understanding the Ameri-
can development, but certainly, assertions about the birth of the Eng-
lish reasonable doubt standard should also be examined under an 
American light to test their likely validity for understanding the 
American origins of the rule.  As such, an examination reveals that 
some claims about reasonable doubt’s development look dubious 
when American conditions and developments are considered.   
III. REASONABLE DOUBT TO EASE JURORS’ SPIRITUAL ANXIETIES 
(AND TO MAKE CONVICTIONS EASIER) 
James Q. Whitman, in his 2008 study, The Origins of Reasona-
ble Doubt: The Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial, also con-
cludes that the standard appeared to make convictions easier, not 
harder, by supplanting the rule that jurors could acquit if they had 
any doubt.  Whitman finds the burden of persuasion’s emergence 
rooted firmly in religion.
27
   
Whitman stresses that not merely the fate of the accused was at 
stake in early trials, but also the souls of those who judged.  This 
was so because “convicting an innocent defendant was regarded, in 
  
flung places, led Morano to suggest that the Massachusetts proceedings were an 
important impetus for the rule’s general development.  He states,  
By the mid-1790s, reasonable doubt charges appeared in English, Canadi-
an and American cases.  It is at least as likely as not that, because of their 
notoriety, the Boston Massacre Trials influenced these other courts in 
their employment of the reasonable doubt standard and thus significantly 
contributed to the rule’s development as the accepted burden of persua-
sion in criminal cases.   
Morano, supra note 11, at 519.  But see id. at 518 (“[T]he impact of the Boston 
Massacre Trials on subsequent cases is not altogether clear.”). 
 27. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: 
THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 2 (2008) (“This is a book about the 
forgotten theological roots of the criminal trial.”). 
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the older Christian tradition, as a potential mortal sin.”28  This con-
cern was especially high for “‘blood punishments’—that is, execu-
tion and mutilation, the standard criminal punishments of pre-
nineteenth-century law.”29  Consequently, those fearing God’s retri-
bution were reluctant to enter legal condemnations, and this fear 
drove the evolution of the reasonable doubt standard.  Whitman as-
serts that “there is no way to explain ‘reasonable doubt’ unless we 
focus resolutely on the spiritual anxieties of judging . . . .”30  To un-
derstand how that standard came about, “knowledge of the broader 
world of Latin Christendom” is necessary.31 
That Christian doctrine provided a sanctuary for judges.  The 
soul of the judge who authorized a blood punishment was safe as 
long as he strictly followed the legalities and did not use his personal 
knowledge to condemn, for then, theologists had concluded, it was 
not he but the rule of law that was responsible for the judgment.
32
  
Jurors, however, did not have this theological loophole.  A wrong 
decision condemning another to a blood punishment endangered the 
jurors’ soul. 
According to Whitman, the jurors were especially spiritually en-
dangered because “well into the early nineteenth century, jurors were 
still expected to make use of their private knowledge of the case, at 
least occasionally. . . . This deserves to be underlined, since histori-
  
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 151 (emphasis in original). 
 31. Id. at 126.  Whitman notes that others have also recognized that the actors in 
common law trials were afraid of making the legal judgments and refers to histori-
ans citing fears of vengeance, criminal liability, and making mistakes that could 
damage a career.  Whitman concedes, “There is undoubtedly some truth in all of 
these explanations of the dangers of judging.  In particular, there is no doubt that 
fear of vengeance was strong in the Middle Ages, though it had faded by the 
eighteenth century.”  Id. at 151.  Whitman, however, maintains that these explana-
tions largely miss the mark because they “explain premodern fears by anything 
except the fear of damnation.” WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 151; see also id. at 186 
(noting that the likelihood of retaliation had ebbed by the late eighteenth century, 
but “the fear of moral responsibility had not.  The risk to the soul still shadowed 
the trial.”). 
 32. Id. at 93–94; see also id. at 151 (“[T]he role of the judge was to be kept sepa-
rate from the role of the witness.  Judges were not to use their private 
knowledge.”). 
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ans have not got the history quite right.”33  Those historians maintain 
that jurors stopped using their personal knowledge of an accused and 
the crime to reach a judgment by the sixteenth century, after the ju-
rors began to hear witness testimony.  But, Whitman maintains, this 
conclusion “is clearly false.”34  Blackstone and other eighteenth cen-
tury writers still asserted that jurors could decide issues based on 
private knowledge as long as they testified in open court.  Whitman 
concludes that while it may have been rare in the eighteenth century 
for jurors to render verdicts on personal knowledge, especially in 
large cities such as London, it still happened.  That rarity, however, 
was the not the real issue for the spiritually anxious.   
 
[F]rom the point of view of moral theology . . . , it did 
not matter all that much whether jurors only potentially 
had such knowledge.  What moral theology required 
was a kind of spiritual exercise: a determined effort to 
keep the body of the judge separate from the body of 
the witness.  The very structure of the office of the juror 




Moreover, the spiritual concerns of jurors were magnified be-
cause an eighteenth century trial, according to Whitman, was not a 
“whodunit” or a what-happened determination, but a proceeding to 
declare formally what was already known.  “[A] trial was not to 
solve factual riddles, but to confirm truths.”36  Guilt was generally 
clear,
37
 and the law’s goal was not to have triers of fact but jurors 
“willing to cooperate in the process of inflicting punishment.  To put 
it a little differently, the primary role of the ‘witness,’ in Christian 
  
 33. Id. at 151–52. 
 34. Id. at 152. 
 35. Id. at 152–53. 
 36. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 195. 
 37. See id. at 203 (noting that a trial “did not involve any great mystery about the 
particular facts: it was assumed that the guilt of the accused would be more or less 
clear, much or most of the time, to the ‘neighbours’ who were called upon to judge 
them.”). 
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moral theology, was not to provide factual clues but to take moral 
responsibility.”38 
Jurors could avoid the spiritual anxiety of wrongly imposing 
blood punishments, of course, by simply refusing to convict.  Even 
so, and even though such punishments decreased in England in the 
1700s,
39
 “the fear of divine vengeance remained strong.”40  This 
fault line—guilty defendant, but jurors concerned for their souls in 
authorizing blood punishments—forced out the reasonable doubt 
rule. Whitman concludes, “It was the resulting tensions that pro-
duced the reasonable doubt formula at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury: ‘Reasonable doubt’ emerged as formula intended to ease the 
fears of those jurors who might otherwise refuse to pronounce the 
defendant guilty.”41  
The moral literature of the eighteenth century, according to 
Whitman, lit the path out of the spiritual thicket by distinguishing 
  
 38. Id. at 203. 
 39. Blood punishments diminished in eighteenth century England because trans-
portation to the American colonies substituted for many harsher punishments and 
because jurors “avoided inflicting blood punishments through the ‘pious perjury,’ 
systematically undervaluing stolen goods in order to allow the accused to escape 
the most severe penalties of the law.”  Id. at 187.  Whitman says that if all blood 
punishments had been eliminated, “there would have been much less need for the 
reasonable doubt instruction. . . . Nevertheless, these changes in punishment prac-
tices were not enough to eliminate all moral concerns.”  Id.  Of course, the fact 
that juries indulged in pious perjury undercuts Whitman’s arguments about the 
strength of the spiritual anxieties jurors faced.  “Such acts of mercy . . . suggest 
that oaths were not always taken literally and that jurors in such instances did not 
anticipate divine retribution.”  BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: 
ENGLAND, 1550–1720 21 (2000). 
 40. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 204.  
 41. Id. at 186.  Whitman also maintains that the same dynamic produced the jury 
unanimity rule.  He stresses, again, that the purpose of trials was not fundamental-
ly to determine facts but to obtain moral judgments that could imperil jurors’ 
souls.  He continued:  
There is no reason to suppose that an uncertain fact is more securely es-
tablished because twelve out of twelve laypeople agree on it, rather than 
nine out of twelve, or ten out of twelve.  The unanimity rule serves a dif-
ferent purpose: it allows the twelve to share the heavy moral responsibil-
ity for judgment, and therefore to diffuse it among themselves.  The una-
nimity rule is a moral comfort rule . . . .   
Id. at 204. 
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between “doubts” and “scruples.”  “Christians were to stay upon the 
safer path, which meant that they were to listen to their doubts. . . . 
Doubts were legitimate and had to be obeyed; scruples were foolish 
and had to be ignored.”42  The distinction was grounded in reason.  
“In particular, the moralists held, the good Protestant was always to 
use his ‘reason,’ wherever possible, in order to remove his  
doubts. . . . Doubts were, as they always had been, subject to a test of 
reason . . . .”43  Scruples, on the other hand, “were dangerously irra-
tional impulses.”44  Following such scruples “might easily lead the 
Christian into a terrible error, the error of sins of omissions.”45  
When applied to criminal trials, this distinction meant that a juror 




Whitman accepts that the standard’s initial appearance is un-
known, but maintains that even so, examination of early instances is 
fruitful.
47
  He briefly discusses its first known articulation in the 
Boston Massacre trial.  Those proceedings will be explored more 
fully later in this article, but Whitman concludes that they support 
his thesis: “The Boston Massacre trial arguments, like everything 
else we have seen from the period, were framed in the language of 
the safer path theology.”48 
Whitman, however, focuses more on the next discovered reason-
able doubt cases, which come from London’s Old Bailey in the 
1780s.
49
  He sees these trials mirroring older ones in that they were 
  
 42. Id. at 190. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 179. 
 45. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 180. 
 46. See id. at 192 (“All of this should make it completely unsurprising to discov-
er that the reasonable doubt standard grew out of the old safer way moral theology 
of doubt, and the old fears that public justice would be endangered by the private 
conscience; and so it did.”). 
 47. See id. at 193 (“To hunt for the first case use of the rule would be misguided; 
. . . the reasonable doubt rule was quite simply in the air in the later eighteenth 
century.  Nevertheless, it is revealing to look closely at the earliest cases in which 
the formula does turn up.”). 
 48. Id. at 194. 
 49. See Thomas P. Gallanis, Reasonable Doubt and the History of the Criminal 
Trial, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 941, 941 n. 1 (2009) (“The Old Bailey was the principal 
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not proceedings to find facts, but to make moral judgments.
50
  It was 
a time when “the reluctance of jurors to convict could infuriate crit-
ics of English criminal justice. . . . [For some commentators,] Eng-
lish criminal jury trial seemed a wayward institution in the latter 
decades of the eighteenth century—a setting in which unduly ‘merci-
ful’ jurors ignored obvious truths.”51   
The Old Bailey judges responded in the 1780s by instructing ju-
rors to acquit if they had a reasonable doubt.  For Whitman it is 
clear that “[t]he underlying concern [of the instruction] was not with 
protecting the defendant at all.  It was with protecting the jurors.”52     
Whitman goes on to consider more specific reasons “why the 
standard established itself in the Old Bailey when it did, in the mid-
1780s.”53  Whitman suggests that the reasonable doubt standard then 
emerged because American independence made transportation of 
  
criminal court for cases of serious crime arising in the city of London and the ad-
jacent county of Middlesex.”). 
 50. Whitman states that eighteenth century 
[j]urists still sometimes spoke of the trial in the way their medieval fore-
bears had done—as an event involving a solemn moral decision to con-
demn a clearly guilty defendant. . . . [A] trial was not to solve factual rid-
dles but to confirm truths.  We find the same assumptions in the reports of 
Old Bailey.  
WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 195.  Whitman says that pre-1800 courts did not 
have plea-bargaining.  With nearly every case going to trial, guilty defendants 
were “paraded before the court for ceremonious condemnation.” Id. at 19.  
Today a trial is, in essence, the final chapter of a detective story with the jury 
charged with finding the facts, but in the past it was different.   
Instead, they often thought of the trial as a solemn event in which the 
court and the community formally took responsibility for inflicting pun-
ishment on a defendant who was fairly clearly guilty. . . . Certainly there 
were occasionally factual puzzles that the jurors had to solve.  But fre-
quently the toughest question in such a trial was whether the defendant’s 
neighbors would be willing to take the momentous step of giving their 
formal, unanimous, ‘confirmation.’  
Id.; see also id. at 209 (“Because the old moral theology assumed that the 
facts would typically be pretty straightforward, and that the accused was usu-
ally guilty, its moral focus was not on the problems of fact-finding.  Instead, 
its focus was on the morality of punishment itself.”). 
 51. Id. at 197. 
 52. Id. at 194. 
 53. Id. at 199. 
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convicted criminals to the American colonies, which had reduced 
blood punishments, impossible.
54
  After 1783, when American inde-
pendence was formally recognized, jurors had to be especially con-
cerned that a conviction would lead to an execution. 
The first cases using the reasonable doubt formula in 
the Old Bailey crop up during that same period [when 
transportation punishment was unavailable]—indeed, 
they crop up in the year [1783] in which it became clear 
for the first time that transportation to American was an 
impossibility, while it remained uncertain what was 
otherwise to be the fate of those convicted.  Perhaps—
though I offer the suggestion somewhat diffidently—
this raised the punishment stakes sufficiently that jurors 
needed more coaxing to convict than had been the case 
in previous decade.  Seventeen eighty-three was the 
year when no one could be quite certain where the fu-
ture of punishment lay.
55
 
While Whitman does mention the Boston Massacre trials, his 
study concentrates on English and continental developments, and 
even if he has correctly identified the original purposes for the emer-
gence of the English reasonable doubt standard, it should not be as-
sumed that his conclusions truly inform us about the original Ameri-
can meaning of the standard.  As we have seen, the available histori-
  
 54. Gallanis, supra note 49, at 962 (“After American transportation ended in 
1775, England responded initially by ordering hard labor in hulks on the river 
Thames and in houses of correction, and later by beginning an ambitious pro-
gram of prison construction and initiating transportation to Australia.  These 
noncapital punishments were likely more severe than the prior regime of 
transportation to the established colonies in America, but the punishments did 
not involve blood.”). 
 55. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 200; see also id. at 187 (“[T]o the extent 
that transportation substituted for execution, or other mitigating devices were 
used, the moral stakes were lower.  If blood punishments had been completely 
eliminated, there would have been much less need for the reasonable doubt 
instruction.  Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that the reasonable doubt in-
struction emerged in the Old Bailey (the criminal court of London) in the 
early 1780s, precisely the years when the system of transportation had col-
lapsed in the wake of the American Revolution.”).  
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cal record indicates that Americans did not simply inherit reasonable 
doubt from England, but used it earlier than did the English.  Instead, 
his history is valuable only if the forces and currents he identifies as 
producing the standard operated in a similar manner in America to 
the way they did in England.  His conclusions need to be examined 
under an American light, and this focus makes it dubious that his 
assertions can be applied to the original American meaning and pur-
poses of reasonable doubt. 
IV. EXAMINING THE CLAIMS UNDER AN AMERICAN LIGHT 
A.  Transportation 
Clearly, the suspension of English transportation in the 1780s 
cannot explain the presence of the standard in the 1770 Boston Mas-
sacre trial.  Perhaps that punishment’s hiatus forced out the rule in 
England;
56
 clearly, it did not in America.  Instead, Whitman’s history 
  
 56. Cf. Gallanis, supra note 49, at 963 (“Lacking better primary sources, I cannot 
warrant that there is no connection between the rising harshness of punishment 
and the use of the reasonable doubt instruction.  But the link between them re-
mains to be proven.”).  Whitman relies on the Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP), 
“pamphlet accounts of criminal trials, printed and sold to members of the public.”  
Id. at 962.  Reports of the reasonable doubt instruction first appear in the OBSP in 
the 1780s.  As Thomas Gallanis points out, however, this source has limitations.  
The OBSP concentrated on the proceeding’s aspects that were most likely to catch 
a layperson’s interest.  For cost reasons, the reports were often minimal, especially 
before 1778.  Gallanis notes that the period of 1782 to 1790 brought lengthier 
reports and states, “Given the changes in size and detail of the OBSP, it is often 
hard to tell whether something first perceived in the mid-1780s is truly new or 
simply the result of fuller reporting.”  Id. at 962; see also George Fisher, The Ju-
ry’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L. J. 575, 639 (1997) (“For now it is safe to 
assume, . . . that what the Sessions Paper reports probably did happen, but what it 
omits to mention might have happened too.”); c.f. Thomas Y. Davies, Selective 
Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Con-
frontation Were or Were Not “Established At The Time Of the Founding”, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 618 n. 7 (2009) (“Because case reporting was quite 
unsystematic in earlier times, it is certainly possible that a doctrine could have 
developed in cases that were never reported and are now lost in time . . . . [O]ur 
knowledge of legal evolution is dependent on the happenstances of when doctrines 
were preserved in reported cases.”)  
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has a bearing on the American development of reasonable doubt on-
ly if the forces other than transportation’s interruption that he identi-
fies had the same effect in the colonies that he asserts that they did in 
England.   
B.  Spiritual Anxieties 
Whitman’s central assertion, however, is not about transporta-
tion, but that because jurors had such strong spiritual anxieties in 
imposing blood punishments, jurors, acquitted if they had any 
doubts, rational or not, with the resulting acquittals forcing out the 
reasonable doubt standard.  It allowed for convictions that kept ju-
rors’ souls safe.  There are reasons, however, to doubt that this dy-
namic much affected American jurors.   
First, religion in general may not have had a particularly strong 
hold in eighteenth century America.  Thus, historian Stephen Prothe-
ro maintains, “Christianity was not particularly popular in the New 
World colonies.  Spiritual indifference was the rule . . . .” 57  This did 
change somewhat in the mid-eighteenth century, but, according to 
Prothero, many have misperceived the true extent of the religious 
fervor.   
 
The celebrated Great Awakening of the 1740s power-
fully reversed that decline in many locales, but its re-
vivals were not as widespread as many historians have 
claimed . . . . On the eve of the Revolution, only 17 per-
cent of adults were church members, and spiritual leth-
argy was the rule.
58
   
 
  
 57. STEPHEN PROTHERO, AMERICAN JESUS: HOW THE SON OF GOD BECAME A 
NATIONAL ICON 43 (2003). 
 58. Id. at 44.  But see John E. Smith et. al., Introduction in A JONATHAN 
EDWARDS READER vii (John E. Smith, Harry S. Stout & Kenneth P. Minkema, ed. 
1995) (noting that the early eighteenth century in America was “an age when reli-
gion predominated.”). 
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And however extensive the revivals, their effect on jury trials can 
be doubted since at a time when jurors were male, women were ap-
parently more swept up in these religious awakenings than men.
59
 
Furthermore, the predominant theology in eighteenth century 
America seems to be fundamentally different from the religious 
teachings that Whitman describes as having produced the spiritual 
angst that resulted in reasonable doubt.  The beliefs he finds so in-
fluential stem from medieval Catholicism.
60
  While we may not al-
ways recognize the influences that compel us to act, it should give 
pause if the argument is that eighteenth century Americans, the Puri-
tans, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, the Anabaptists, the Quakers, 
and even the Anglicans as well as the Deists and the nonbelievers, 
were acting under ancient Catholicism’s power.  If they were, surely 
they were not consciously doing so.  
The concern over blood punishments and the safer way theology 
is based on the belief that salvation was won or lost by a person’s 
deeds.  This is at odds with much that was preached in eighteenth 
century America.  For example, Jonathan Edwards,
61America’s most 
prominent theologian of that era, said time and again that salvation 
came through faith and God’s grace, not through good deeds.62  Ed-
wards stressed that man’s nature was inherently evil, and only the 
magnanimity of God’s mercy prevented a person from being 
  
 59. In a 1737 letter to Benjamin Colman, pastor of Boston’s Brattle Street 
Church, Jonathan Edwards stated, “I hope that 300 souls were savingly brought 
home to Christ in this town in the space of half a year (how many more I don’t 
guess) and about the same number of males as females; which, by what I have 
heard Mr. Stoddard say, was far from what has been usual in years past, for he 
observed that in his time, many more women were converted than men.” Id. at 65. 
 60. See WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 3. 
 61. See John E. Smith et. al., Introduction in JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, 
supra note 58, at vii (“Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) is colonial America’s 
greatest theologian and philosopher.  During his life, he served as teacher, pastor, 
revivalist, missionary, and college president, in the process established himself as 
one of the most influential churchmen in the Anglo-American religious world.”). 
 62. E.g. JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra note 58, at 47 (“And thus it is that 
we are said to be justified by faith alone: that is, we are justified only because our 
souls close and join with Christ the Savior, his salvation, and the way of it; and not 
because of the excellency or loveliness of any of our dispositions or actions, that 
moves God to it.”). 
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plunged into the abyss.
63
  Redemption was not earned by a person’s 
deeds as a desired good can be bought by money.  Salvation came 
through God, and man could only hope to obtain it through faith and 
being born again in Jesus.
64
  Good deeds, in this Protestant view, 
were secondary to faith and God’s grace.65  A person’s soul was 
fundamentally put in jeopardy not because of a bad deed, but be-
cause the person lacked the requisite faith.  Edwards was not alone; 
the theology of faith over good deeds was the dominant theme of the 
eighteenth century revivals.
66
  We might hope that in all eras jurors 
  
 63. See e.g., id. at 96 (“Your wickedness makes you as it were heavy as lead, and 
to tend downward with great weight and pressure towards hell; and if God should 
let you go, you would immediately sink and swiftly descend and plunge into the 
bottomless gulf, and your healthy constitution, and your own care and prudence, 
and best contrivance, and all your righteousness, would have no more influence to 
uphold you and keep you out of hell, than a spider’s web would have to stop a 
falling rock.”).  See also id. at 224–25 (noting that man has an “innate sinful de-
pravity of the heart . . . [which is man’s] natural or innate disposition . . . without 
the interposition of divine grace.  Thus, that state of man’s nature, that disposition 
of the mind, is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which as it is in itself, 
tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were 
it not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue.”).  
 64. See, e.g., id. at 100–02 (“If you cry to God to pity you, he will be so far from 
pitying you in your doleful case, or showing you the least regard or favor, that 
instead that he’ll only tread you under foot . . . . How dreadful is the state of those 
that are daily and hourly in danger of this great wrath, and infinite misery!  But 
this is the dismal case of every soul in this congregation, that has been born again, 
however moral and strict, sober and religious they may otherwise be.”). 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 47 (“And we are justified by obedience or good works, only 
as a principle of obedience or a holy disposition is implied in such a harmonizing 
or joining [with Christ the Savior], and is a secondary expression of the agreement 
and union between the nature of the soul and the gospel, or as an exercise and fruit 
and evidence of faith . . . .”). See also id. at 170–71(“Christian practice is the most 
proper evidence of the gracious sincerity of professors, to themselves and others; 
and the chief of all the marks of grace, the sign of signs, and evidence of evidenc-
es, that which seals and crowns all other signs. . . . Not that there are no other good 
evidences of a state of grace but this. . . . [B]ut yet this is the chief and most proper 
evidence.”).  
 66. For example, the English evangelist, George Whitefield was on his seventh 
American revival tour when he died in Boston September 30, 1770, shortly before 
the Boston Massacre trials.  “Whitefield had by his fiery preaching in the 1740s 
infused with ascetic zeal a whole generation.”  ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 237.  And 
the basic message he presented from Georgia to New York was similar to Ed-
wards’.  Whitefield stated, “[G]ood works have nothing to do with our justification 
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have had a concern over wrongly convicting an accused, but the 
more immediate spiritual concern of eighteenth century Americans, 
if they listened to those who preached to them, was that their innate, 
sinful natures would provoke God to sunder the spider’s web and 
plunge them into perdition.  One would think with that view of eter-
nal life that concern over blood punishments would be well down on 
the list of spiritual anxieties. 
C. The Acquittal Crisis 
Whitman’s thesis contends that the reasonable doubt instruction 
came in response to the jurors’ reluctance to convict.  This suggests 
that something like an acquittal crisis must have existed in the years 
preceding the emergence of the standard.  Whether an eighteenth 
century American acquittal crisis existed, however, seems impossi-
ble to determine.  Thus, nothing has been found to indicate that Mas-
sachusetts not-guilty rates precipitately increased, or increased at all, 
in the period immediately before the Boston Massacre trials.  Noth-
ing has been found to indicate that they did not.  The evidence, one 
way or the other, just does not seem to exist.    
Early American criminal trial records are incomplete.  Douglas 
Greenberg made an extensive study of criminal practice in colonial 
New York and examined surviving records of 5,297 cases, adding, 
however, that “as is readily apparent, this represents only a portion 
of all the cases that actually came before the courts.”67  Jack D. 
Marietta and G.S. Rowe have similarly studied criminal practice in 
early Pennsylvania.  They “undertook to count every crime recorded 
  
in [God’s] sight.  We are justified by faith alone . . . . Notwithstanding, good 
works have their proper place: they justify our faith, though not our persons; they 
follow it, and evidence our justification in the sight of men.”  SERMONS OF 
GEORGE WHITEFIELD 24 (2009); see also id. at xx (“[R]emember that you are 
fallen creatures; that you are by nature lost and estranged from God; and that you 
can never be restored to your primitive happiness, till by being born again of the 
Holy Ghost. . . .”).  
 67. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF 
NEW YORK, 1691–1776 37 (1974).  Greenberg later discusses a New York case 
described by another historian and then says, “It is interesting to note, moreover, 
that this case never appears in any of the surviving court records—another indica-
tion that mine is but a partial sampling of criminal defendants.”  Id. at 82 n. 9. 
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in the extant justice records and other public sources.”68  But, of 
course, other documents might not have survived. 
Greenberg indicates that the limitations of his data make suspect 
comparisons across time periods.  He states, “A serious problem of 
chronological comparability is thereby built into this study, since 
there is no period for which there are surviving records for every 
court.”69  On the other hand, Marietta and Rowe do present decade-
by-decade information about Pennsylvania criminal cases.  A strik-
ing fact is that only a minority of accusations, from any of the dec-
ades, ended with the formal disposition of conviction or acquittal.  
Most dispositions could be labeled “other.”  Some were like civil 
cases and ended by formal or informal arbitration or mediation.  
Some were resolved when a judge imposed a bond on a defendant to 
guarantee future good behavior.  Some cases faded away for lack of 




Greenberg’s study found something similar for New York.  He 
found that 48% of the cases ended with a conviction and 15% in ac-
quittals.  “The missing 37% of the 5,297 cases were never resolved 
at all . . . . They simply disappear from the records entirely before a 
verdict is recorded.  This is an essential point to keep in mind.”71   
In light of these dispositions, patterns, and the possibility of 
missing data, maybe the best way to analyze the information on what 
jurors were doing is to examine Marietta and Howe’s calculation for 
what they call the “simple conviction rate (SCR), which is the per-
cent of convictions among all charges brought to trial.”72  Those fig-
ures show a lower conviction rate in mid-eighteenth century Penn-
sylvania than at the end of the seventeenth century.73  They also 
show the 1730s conviction rate of 76.3% dropping to 67.5% in the 
1740s.74  Perhaps, although we have no evidence of anyone arguing 
  
 68. JACK D. MARIETTA & G.S. ROWE, TROUBLED EXPERIMENT: CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682–1800 2 (2006). 
 69. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 37. 
 70. See MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 44–47. 
 71. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 71. 
 72. MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 45. 
73.  Id. at 46. 
74.  Id. 
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this, that drop fueled a contention that there were too many “wrong” 
acquittals which helped lead to a pro-prosecution reasonable doubt 
standard decades later.  On the other hand, the conviction rate in 
Pennsylvania rose to 71.3% in the 1750s and stayed basically steady 
at that level for the rest of the century.  In other words, the convic-
tion rate had rebounded well before we know of any articulation of 
the reasonable doubt standard anywhere.
75
  All in all, it is hard to see 
this data as indicating an “acquittal crisis” that brought about a new 
standard for the burden of proof. 
D.  Other Explanations for “Wrong” Acquittals 
If there were early American “wrong” acquittals, the cause may 
have been something other than spiritual anxiety over blood punish-
ments.  Religious people with differing beliefs can be reluctant to 
have their actions result in an execution; the non-religious can feel 
the same.  Certainly, empathy for a defendant can be a factor in ac-
quittals, and this factor seems to have affected colonial jurors, as 
indicated by Pennsylvania infanticide prosecutions. 
A woman charged with killing a newborn could be tried for in-
fanticide.  The law presumed that a child was born alive, and the 
punishment was death.  The defendants were almost always young, 
single women, and indictments for the crime rose steady, especially 
after 1750.  Convictions, however, did not keep pace.  “Juries balked 
at assigning young women to death in infanticide cases and effec-
tively thwarted the law.”76  If the defendant showed that she had 




Something other than spiritual anxieties over mistaken imposi-
tions of blood punishments was operating.   If the driving force was 
  
 75. Id. at 46.  Indeed, the lowest reported conviction rate was in the 1710s of 
59.7%, thirteen points below the rate for the previous decade.  The 1720s, howev-
er, saw the rate rebound to 74.6% with no change in the burden of proof as far as 
we know.  Id.  
 76. Id. at 116–17. 
 77. See id. at 117 (“If defendants in infanticide cases shed tears or were found to 
have prepared in any way for the coming of the child (‘benefit of linen,’ it was 
called), acquittal ordinarily followed.  Tears and ‘linen’ indicated to jurors that the 
woman presumably loved the child and regretted its demise.”).   
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the jurors’ concern for their own souls, the acquittals would not have 
been affected by the defendants’ characteristics.  The remedy for this 
acquittal crisis was not to change the burden of proof.  No matter 
what that burden, the sympathy for the defendants would have re-
mained, and in all likelihood, so would have the “wrong” acquittals.  
Instead, the remedy was to alter the punishment, and that is what 
happened with imprisonment replacing death.  With this change and 
further reforms that allowed for greater prosecutorial flexibility in 
charging and for greater jury discretion in determining the punish-
ments, the conviction rate increased without any apparent change in 
the burden of proof.
78
 
E.  American Jurors as Finders of Fact 
Whitman views almost all eighteenth century acquittals as 
wrongful.  He maintains that trials were not about finding facts since 
it was clear that the defendants were guilty.  The proceedings only 
sought to have society, as represented by juries, render moral judg-
ments in order to punish those who had broken the law.
79
  Even if 
this were true for England, the situation in America appears different 
and appeared differently to eighteenth century Americans. 
For example, Douglas Greenberg’s examination of early New 
York criminal cases found that women were frequently accused of 
theft, a crime with a high acquittal rate.
80
  Many of these were un-
married women, who had difficulty in supporting themselves and 
were often seen as a threat to traditional family life.
81
  Greenberg 
maintains that, “the single woman was more likely than others of her 
sex to be an object of suspicion and antagonism—the natural social 
pariah.”82  These conditions provide an explanation for the large 
number of acquittals—many of those women were wrongly accused.  
  
 78. See MARIETTA & HOWE, supra note 68, at 116 (“In the first ten prosecutions 
following the law’s revision on infanticide, juries voted seven convictions.”).  
 79. See supra text accompanying note 50.  
 80. GREENBERG, supra note 67, at 79. 
 81. See id. at 80 (“Unlike single men, they often had no legitimate means of 
supporting themselves.  Moreover, they seemed to pose a threat to the stability of 
family life, since they might seduce husbands from the home and hearth to the 
tavern and bawdy house.”). 
 82. Id. 
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Greenberg concedes that not every such verdict came from an impar-
tial consideration of the evidence, but that still  
 
[t]he high percentage of acquittals among women . . . is 
less mystifying if one takes into account the dispropor-
tionately high percentage of single women accused of 
crime, and the strong possibility that some of those ac-
cusations were unwarranted by the facts and closely re-
lated to the social anxieties of eighteenth-century life. . . 
. [T]he marital status of the accused provides the most 
persuasive available explanation . . . [of why more 




Greenberg draws a similar conclusion from data showing that 
there were more acquittals in New York City than the rest of the col-
ony.  He states, “Apprehension of suspects was easier in the city than 
elsewhere, but it was also less likely that those arrested would be 
guilty.  The process of accusation and arrest probably tended to be 
more arbitrary in New York.”84  He reasons that outside the city ar-
rests could be arduous, and constables were unlikely to apprehend 
people unless the officials were fairly sure of guilt.  In contrast, ar-
rests were made in the city on more tenuous grounds.   
 
Because constables were not required to travel long dis-
tances to make arrests, and because individuals were 
more easily located in the city, law-enforcement offic-
ers could be less selective about whom they apprehend-
ed . . . In other words, it was less important in New 
York City to be certain that an individual taken into 
custody was guilty.
85
   
 
The acquittal rate was greater in New York, not because jurors had 
more spiritual anxiety than jurors elsewhere about convictions, but 
because more of the charges in the city were dubious.  The trials, at 
  
 83. Id. at 82–83. 
84   Id. at 86. 
 85. Id. 
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least in Greenberg’s eyes, were often about determining the facts and 
weighing the evidence, and verdict patterns indicate that all defend-
ants were not clearly guilty. 
Furthermore, those familiar with American law in the era when 
the reasonable doubt standard emerged, at least as indicated by 
James Wilson, saw trials as proceedings not merely to confirm what 
was already known with a guilty verdict, but to determine disputed 
facts.  Wilson, perhaps the most important legal thinker in eighteenth 
century America, was one of only six people to sign both the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution, and his contributions at 
the constitutional convention were second to only those of James 
Madison.  He came to America in 1765 after being born and 
schooled in Scotland and was one of the best-educated people in the 
New World.
86
  Wilson had a large and successful legal practice in 
Philadelphia,
87
 was regarded as the father of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1790, and was an original justice of the Supreme Court.
88
    
He was appointed to the first law professorship at the College of 
Philadelphia, and, starting in 1790, he gave lengthy legal lectures 
that he hoped would lay the foundation for an American system of 
law.
89
  Although the lectures do not expressly discuss any control-
ling burden of proof, they do extensively discuss juries and trials.  In 
Wilson’s view, juries resolved guilt and innocence by determining 
facts.  Wilson said it was “of immense consequence . . . that jurors 
should possess the spirit of just discernment, to discriminate between 
the innocent and the guilt. . . .”90  Jurors “will be triers not only of 
facts; but also the credibility of the witnesses.  They will know 
whom and what to believe . . . .”91  Jurors were to use their reasoning 
to weigh the evidence.   
 
The testimony of one witness will not be rejected mere-
ly because it stands single; nor will the testimony of 
  
 86. See Robert Green McCloskey, Introduction in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 9 (1967) [hereinafter WILSON]. 
 87. Id. at 18. 
 88. Id. at 2. 
 89. Id. at 28–29. 
 90. Id. at 74. 
91. Id. at 332 
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two witnesses be believed, if it be encountered by rea-
son and probability.  These advantages of a trial by jury 
are important in all causes: in criminal causes, they are 
of peculiar importance.
92
   
 
Wilson realized that facts often would not be clear because not all 
witnesses would tell the truth, and he gave “reasons for suspecting or 
rejecting testimony.”93  America entrusted jurors to make such de-
terminations. “In no case . . . does [the law] order a witness to be 
believed; for jurors are triers of the credibility of witnesses, as well 
as of the truth of facts.”94  
F.  The Importance of Juries to Americans 
If the spiritual terror among those who might serve as jurors was 
as strong as Whitman maintains, we might expect to find significant 
resistance to the jury system.  The opposite, of course, was true.  
Eighteenth century Americans embraced the system as central to 
their freedoms and derided and fought English denials or abridge-
ment of jury trials.
95
  The newly independent states guaranteed crim-
inal jury trials in their fundamental charters.  The main body of the 
  
 92. Id.. 
 93. WILSON, supra note 86, at 386. 
 94. Id. at 383.  While Whitman and Morano see this era as one limiting jury 
power, Wilson saw that judges were increasingly granting jurors more discretion 
in weighing credibility.  Wilson noted that “every intelligent person, who is not 
infamous or interested” could testify and that the judge applied these competency 
rules.  Id. at 545.  Wilson continued, however, that the line that made a person 
incompetent to testify was not clear.  Often that interest only affected the credibil-
ity of a witness.  Wilson, recognizing a legal trend that would continue, stated, “In 
doubtful cases of this description, the judges especially of late years, presume in 
favor of the province of the jury.  This is done with great reason.”  Id. 
 95. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 
681 (1996) (“No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights than the idea of the 
jury.  The only right secured in all state constitutions penned between 1776 and 
1787 was the right of jury trial in criminal cases . . . .”); see also Eben Moglen, 
Consider Zenger: Partisan Politics and the Legal Profession in Provincial New 
York, 94 COL. L. REV. 1495, 1520 (1994) (“British North Americans were willing 
to respond with organized violence when jury trial was interfered with by an asert-
edly sovereign Parliament in the 1760s and 1770s.”). 
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Constitution guarantees criminal jury trials as, of course, does the 
Sixth Amendment.  Juries were considered essential.
96
  Our political 
history does not show the rabid fear of making the kinds of judg-
ments that Whitman maintains many jurors had.  Instead, Americans 
wanted juries, insisted upon juries, fought for juries, and counted 
juries a fundamental right. 
G.  An American Reluctance to Convict 
All this does not mean that American jurors did not dread con-
victing an accused, especially in a capital case.  James Wilson cer-
tainly recognized that reality, but his response was not to suggest 
making convictions easier.  Instead, he found the answer in his view 
of jury unanimity. 
Wilson asserted that the “conviction of a crime—particularly of a 
capital crime” required jury unanimity.97  On the other hand, in what 
might be a surprise to modern readers, acquittals required only one 
juror.  He stated:  
 
If a single sentiment is not for conviction; [sic] then a 
verdict of acquittal is the immediate consequence. . . . 
For by the law, as it has been stated, twelve votes of 
conviction are necessary to compose a verdict of con-
viction: but eleven votes of conviction and one against 




Wilson then asked a series of rhetorical questions aimed at the 
natural reluctance of jurors.  
 
  
 96. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1997) (“Americans [gave] two rights 
preeminent importance.  If the rights to representation and to trial by jury were left 
to operate in full force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and liberties 
of the people.”). 
 97. WILSON, supra note 86, at 503; see also id. at 525 (“[W]e shall find no au-
thority to conclude, that, in civil causes, the verdict of a jury must be founded on 
unanimous opinion.”). 
 98. Id. at 531. 
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Under this disposition of things, can an honest and con-
scientious juror dread or suffer any inconvenience, in 
discharging his important trust, and performing his im-
portant duty, honestly and conscientiously?  Under this 
disposition of things, will the citizens discover that 
strong reluctance, which they often and naturally dis-





Wilson was aware of jurors’ fears of rendering criminal judg-
ments, but he showed no concern that juries would acquit when they 
ought not.  He approvingly stressed the juror’s power to acquit.  
“The jury retain[s] an indisputable, unquestionable right to acquit the 
person accused, if, in their private opinions, they disbelieve the ac-
cusers.”100  Wilson did not present arguments to rein in jury discre-
tion to produce more convictions but, instead, stated that America’s 
unanimity rule favored acquittals.  The notion that this was an age 
when American jury powers were being circumscribed to make con-
victions easier is not supported by, and runs counter to, these eight-





 99. Id. 
100. Id. at 383. 
101. No doubt acquittals could be found to support the notion that early American 
jurors were reluctant to impose blood punishments.  But then, contrary instances 
should also be considered.  For example, the Portland, (now) Maine newspaper, 
Eastern Herald, of July 9, 1792, reported a murder conviction under the headline, 
“Trial and Condemnation of Joshua Abbot, Jun.”  Abbot, the story said, was in his 
sixties, a husband, and the father of six. Trial and Condemnation of Joshua Abbot, 
Jun., E. HERALD, July 9, 1792.  The previous February Moses Gubtail went to 
Abbot’s house and argued over a tool.  Id.  “Gubtail appeared to be in a violent 
passion, and told Abbot that he was ‘damn’d disobliging old fellow’ but that not-
withstanding this, he should have had the flax break had it not been for his 
‘damn’d old bitch of a wife.’”  Id.  Abbot ordered Gubtail out of the house, but 
Gubtail stood outside and yelled several times that he would “cuff” Abbot if Abbot 
came out.  Id.  An “exasperated” Abbot picked up a piece of an ox sled and struck 
Gubtail on the head.  Id.  Urged by his brother Benjamin, “who was present during 
the whole transaction, and who was the only witness of any importance in the 
cause,” Gubtail finally went home where he died within two days.  Id.  The result-
ing conviction came in spite of a vigorous defense.  Each of Abbot’s two attorneys 
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V.   THE BOSTON MASSACRE TRIALS 
Perhaps the best crucible for testing out assertions about the ori-
gins of reasonable doubt, however, is to examine them in the context 
of the Boston Massacre trials.  If claims do not seem to make sense 
or ring true in the context of the first known use of the standard, they 
ought to be considered suspect.  And the Boston Massacre Trials do 
not support many of the assertions made about reasonable doubt’s 
development. 
The editors of John Adams’ legal papers, L. Kinvin Wroth and 
Hiller B. Zobel, present the basic facts of the shootings that led to 
the trials: 
British troops had been garrisoned in Boston since 
1768; thereafter friction between inhabitants and sol-
diers had increased steadily; this friction generated heat 
and even occasional sparks of violence; in the evening 
of 5 March 1770, the lone sentry before the Custom 
House on King Street became embroiled with a group 
of people as he stood his post; he called for help; in re-
sponse, six soldiers, a corporal, and Captain Thomas 
Preston marched down to the Custom House from the 
Main Guard; the tumult continued; the soldiers fired, 
their bullets striking a number of persons, of whom 





gave a lengthy summation.  Id.  “During which time, if the most clear and judi-
cious statement of evidence—if the profoundest knowledge of law—and if the 
utmost ingenuity in the application of it, could have prevailed, Abbot had escaped 
death.”  Id.  On the other hand, the prosecution summation “was short; but point-
ed, and fatal.”  Id.  After the trial judges gave instructions that “were lengthy in 
their observations—in which they discovered great ability, with a tincture of legal 
severity[,]” the jury received the case at one in the morning and pronounced the 
conviction at eight.  Id. This was not a jury reluctant to impose a blood punish-
ment, even though the verdict came as a shock to the community.  The newspaper 
reported, “There were nearly two thousand persons present at the trial—not two 
individuals of whom, perhaps, expected this bloody verdict.”  Id.  
102. ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 1. 
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A.  Jurors Determining Disputed Facts 
About the resulting trials, Whitman asserts “that there was once 
again no uncertainty about the facts.”103  If he means that no one 
doubted that the eight particular British soldiers were involved in a 
shooting that left five dead, he is correct.  If, however, Whitman 
means that the guilt of the eight was clear, he is just wrong. 
Captain Preston was tried separately from the others, and his trial 
centered on whether he gave the order to fire.  Witnesses testified 
that he did so, but defense testimony disputed those assertions.
104
  
Hiller Zobel, in his study of the trials, states that the rebuttal evi-
dence was so strong that an acquittal became assured not because the 
defense’s case made it clear what happened, but because it created “a 
picture of confusion, noise and verbal threats. . . . [It] raised serious 
doubts that the order to fire came from Preston.”105  The acquittal 
came not because every one knew what happened, but the oppo-
site—because this was “a case so full of factual uncertainty and evi-
dentiary conflict.”106  The facts were in doubt even after the trial, and 
whatever the burden of proof, the acquittal was correct.
107
 
The second trial, Rex v. Wemms, the trial of the soldiers, contains 
the first recorded instance of an attorney arguing the reasonable 
doubt standard and its first recorded judicial instruction.
108
  The is-
sue of guilt was closer than in Preston’s trial.109  Under controlling 
law, once it was proved that a soldier killed a particular person, the 
  
103. WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 193. 
104. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 249–50. 
105. Id. at 255–56. 
106. Id. at 256; see also id. at 198 (“Like most of the events during the confusion 
in King Street, the rate of firing is clouded with uncertainty.”). 
107. The prosecution probably did not know this before the trial.  The prosecuto-
rial office was a part time position, and no money was allocated for investigation.  
His job was solely to make the trial presentation.  “In other words, he was strictly 
a litigator, not an investigator.”  Id. at 105. 
108. This does not mean that the reasonable doubt standard did not appear in the 
Preston trial.  The surviving records of Preston are slenderer than for Wemms.  
While enough exists for a reasonably confident picture of much of what happened 
in Preston, only abbreviated notes are available for the attorneys’ summations and 
the judges’ instructions.  See id. at 249; ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 89–97. 
109. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 268 (“[T]he question of guilt in the soldiers’ case 
was much closer than in Preston’s.”). 
File: Jonakait - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V4 Created on:  6/1/2012 1:57:00 PM Last Printed: 6/1/2012 2:00:00 PM 




burden was on him to show that the killing was justified, that is, that 
he acted in self-defense.
110
  Wemms focused on whether the soldiers 
justifiably feared for their safety before they fired.  The facts, how-
ever, were and remain murky.  The jurors’ job was not to confirm 
what was clear, but to make determinations about whether testimony 
was correct.  Thus, John Adams, in his defense summation, stated 
that witnesses could be, and were, mistaken.
111
  Judge Trowbridge 
instructed the jurors that they ought to reconcile testimony if they 
could, but if that were not possible, “settle the fact as you verily be-
lieve it to be.”112  Later, he noted that testimony indicated that one 
soldier did not fire and another fired at a boy and missed, but “the 
witnesses are not agreed as to the person who fired at the boy, or as 
to him who did not fire at all.”113  Similarly, that judge highlighted 
that all the evidence could not be correct.  For example, testimony 
indicated, “that there are two guns of eight not discharged and yet it 
is said seven were fired.  This evinces the uncertainty of some of the 
testimonies.”114 
Zobel concludes:  
 
Somehow it seems fitting that an event so historically in-
evitable and yet so basically insignificant should have 
taken place on a moonlit, night before scores of people, 
  
110. Id. at 242 (“Underlying both cases was the legal principle that, once the fact 
of killing had been proved, the killer bore the burden of convincing the jury that 
the homicide was legally justified.”)  Samuel Quincy in addressing the jury for the 
prosecution in Wemms stated, “It is a rule of law Gentleman, when the fact of kill-
ing is once proved, every circumstance alleviating, excusing, or justifying, in order 
to extenuate the crime must be proved by the prisoners, for the law presumes the 
fact malicious, untill [sic] the contrary appears in evidence.”  ADAMS PAPERS, 
supra note 26, at 156. 
111. See ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 261. (“[I]t is apparent, that witnesses 
are liable to make mistakes . . . . I am sure that you are satisfied by this time, by 
many circumstances, that [Mr. Bass] is totally mistaken in this matter . . . .”); see 
also id. at 265 (explaining that the witness Langford “is however most probably 
mistaken in this matter, and confounds one time with another, a mistake which has 
been made by many witnesses, in this case, and considering the confusion and the 
terror of the scene, is not to be wondered at.”). 
112. Id. at 295 
113. Id. at 298. 
114. Id. at 308. 
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without leaving any two witnesses able to give the same 
account of what happened.  If the trials were attempts to 
establish the truth, they failed; no one yet knows what re-
ally happened.
115
   
 
What we do know is that the jury acquitted six soldiers and convict-
ed two of only manslaughter.
116
   
B.  Jurors’ Private Knowledge 
Unlike what Whitman suggests about eighteenth century trials, 
the jurors could not use their private knowledge in the Massacre tri-
als.117  Thus, defense attorney Josiah Quincy told the jury in an open-
ing statement:  
 
But let it be borne deep upon our minds, that the prison-
ers are to be condemned by the evidence here in Court 
produced against them, and by nothing else.  Matters 
heard or seen abroad, are to have no weight: in general 




Justice Trowbridge instructed the jurors that if any of them had rele-
vant knowledge of the case, they should be sworn and testify.
119
  He 
  
115. ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 303. 
116. ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 312–14.  Those two “prayed the Benefit of 
Clergy, which was allowed them, and thereupon they were each burnt in the hand, 
in open Court, and discharged.”  Id. at 314. 
117. Id. at 166. 
118. Id.  Quincy acknowledged that apparently damaging information had ap-
peared about the defendants, but Quincy gave lack of confrontation as a reason for 
the jurors to disregard it.  He said: 
It should be remembered, that we were not present to cross examine: and 
the danger which results from having this publication in the hands of 
those who are to pass upon our lives, ought to be guarded against.  We say 
we are innocent, by our plea, and are not to be denounced upon a new 
species of evidence, unknown in the English system of criminal law. 
 Id. 
119. Id. at 290 (“That if any of the jurors are knowing of the facts, they ought to 
inform the Court of it, be sworn as witnesses, and give their testimonies in Court, 
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went on to state that the verdict was to be based on the evidence pre-
sented in court.   
 
Therefore as by law, you are to settle the facts in this 
case, upon the evidence given you in Court: you must be 
sensible, that in doing it, you ought not have any manner 




C.  Jurors’ Spiritual Anxieties 
The spiritual concerns that Whitman identifies as leading to 
wrongful acquittals and forcing out the reasonable doubt rule had no 
discernible role in the Massacre trials.  Nothing indicates that jurors 
were concerned about their souls for wrongly imposing a blood pun-
ishment.  Instead, Bostonians were told something quite different. 
The cry heard again and again was that the righteous should convict, 
not acquit, a cry supported by Biblical injunctions that in effect de-
manded blood.  Souls were at stake, not for imposing a blood pun-
ishment, but if one were not imposed. 
These views started to pervade the atmosphere even earlier than 
the Preston and Wemms trials.  Several weeks before the Boston 
Massacre, the increasing tensions in Massachusetts produced a con-
frontation between Ebenezer Richardson and an angry crowd.  Rich-
ardson fired his musket, wounding several and killing an eleven -
year- old boy.
121
  Within days, a board with biblical quotations was 
publicly posted.  To anyone who might later sit on Richardson’s ju-
ry, two of the sacred quotations were particularly applicable: “‘Thou 
shalt take no satisfaction for the life of MURDERER—he shall sure-
ly be put to death.’  And ‘Though Hand join in Hand, the Wicked 
shall not pass unpunish’d’”122 
  
to the end that it may be legal to their fellows, and the Court may know on what 
evidence the Jury’s verdict is founded.”).  
120. Id. at 291.  Trowbridge gave a similar injunction about the law.  See ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 26, at 291. (“[Y]ou must also be sensible, that you are to take 
the law from the Court, and not collect it from what has been said by People of 
Court, or published in the newspapers, or delivered from the pulpits.”). 
121. See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 176. 
122. Id. at 178. 
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Shortly after the Massacre, Boston clergy urged neither hesitancy 
nor mercy in condemning, but vengeance and convictions. 
The Sunday after the shootings, the young Reverend John 
Lathrop preached a violent sermon in the Old North Church 
on Genesis 3:10: ‘The voice thy brother’s blood crieth unto 
me from the ground.’  He spoke of ‘sorrow for the dead, who 
fell victims to the merciless rage of wicked men; indignation 
against the worst of murderers. . . .’  Another zealous divine, 
the Reverend Charles Chauncy, tried to convince one of the 
wounded to sue Preston for damages.  The man refused . . . . 
Chauncy was unimpressed.  ‘If I was to be one of Jury upon 




Bostonians were citing Genesis 9:6, where God enjoins Noah, 
“Whoever sheds man’s blood, By man his blood shall be shed; For 
in the image of God He made man.”  At Richardson’s trial, held be-
tween the Massacre shootings and the resulting trials, the shorthand 
version of this verse was shouted out to Richardson’s jury as delib-
erations began:  “Blood requires blood.”124 
Appeals to this biblical blood injunction and other similar ones 
urging a killer’s condemnation were so prevalent that they were re-
peatedly addressed in the Massacre trials.  Thus, in the Wemms trial, 
Josiah Quincy’s defense summation acknowledged them, but 
stressed that the defendants “are not to be tried by the Mosaic law: a 
law, we take it, peculiarly designed for the government of a peculiar 
nation, who being in a great measure under a theocratical form of 
government, it’s [sic] institutions cannot, with any propriety, be ad-
duced for our regulation in these days.”125  
Quincy argued that the verse, “[w]hosoever sheddeth blood, by 
man shall his blood be shed” stated a general rule that could not be 
  
123. Id. at 216. 
124. Id. at 225.  The courtroom crowd said more to the jury.  “As the jury began 
filing out, the shouts increased.  ‘Remember, jury,’ someone yelled, ‘you are upon 
oath. . . . Damn him, don’t bring in manslaughter.’  ‘Hang the dog!  Hang him!’  
Damn him, hang him!  Murder no manslaughter.’”  Id.  
125. Josiah Quincy, Josiah Quincy’s Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS 
PAPERS, supra note 26, at 234 (quotations omitted).  
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literally applied because otherwise a person “killing another in self-
defence, would incur the pains of death . . . a doctrine that certainly 
never applied under the Mosaical institution.”126  Quincy felt com-
pelled to address two more apparently condemnatory biblical pas-
sages, stressing that the defendants were only to be judged by the 
evidence and law presented in court.
127
 
John Adams’ summation indicated that a potential juror had been 
excused because that person thought that God’s words to Noah had 
to be followed.
128
  Adams, not surprisingly, was concerned that the 
biblical passages might still affect those on the jury and went on to 
say, “I am afraid many other persons have formed such an opinion . .  
. . but this is not the law which does not punish many kinds of kill-
ings, including those in self defense.”129 
The judges’ concern about the Old Testament passage was so 
strong that they also felt the need to address it.  Judge Trowbridge 
stated that jurors in the course of the year had heard the precept giv-
en to Noah about shedding blood and explicated:  
 
Whence it has been inferred, that whosoever volun-
tarily kills another, whatever the inducement, or 
  
126. Id. at 235. 
127. See id.  He said that “the murderer shall flee to the pit,” which begged the 
question whether the defendants were murderers “in the sense of our laws; for you 
recollect, that what is murder and what is not, is a question of law, arising upon 
facts stated and allowed.”  Similarly, his statement: “You shall take no satisfaction 
for the life of a murderer, which is guilty of death,” begged the same question.  
Quincy went on to state that the defense had no objection to this when properly 
applied.  “If we have committed a fault, on which our laws inflict the punishment 
of death, we must suffer.  But what fault we have cummitted [sic] you are to en-
quire: or rather you, Gentlemen, are to find the facts proved in Court against us, 
and the Judges are to see and consider what the law pronounces touching our of-
fence, and what punishment is thereby inflicted as a penalty.”  Id. 
128. See John Adams, Adams’ Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, su-
pra note 26, at 255 (“I take notice of this, because one gentleman nominated by 
the sheriff, for a Juryman upon this trial, because he said, he believed Capt. Pres-
ton was innocent, but innocent blood had been shed, and therefore somebody 
ought to be hanged for it, which he thought was indirectly giving his opinion in 
this cause.”).  The editors of the Adams Papers noted, “The individual has not 
been identified.”  Id. at 255 n.219. 
129. Id. at 255–56. 
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provocation may be, is a murderer, and as such 
ought to be put to death.  But surely not only the 
avenger of blood, and he who killed a thief breaking 
up an house in the night, were exceptions to the 
general precept, but also he who killed another in 
his own defence.  Even the Jewish Doctors allowed 
this and that justly; because the right of self-defence 
is founded in the law of nature.
130
   
 
Trowbridge stressed and repeated that the defendants were not being 
tried under Jewish law, but under the common law.
131
 
Justice Oliver told the jurors that the command given to Noah 
that “hath lately been urged in the most public manner very indis-
criminately, without any of the softenings of humanity.”132  Oliver 
noted that Moses mentioned a similar precept, but  
 
that Moses was the best Commentator on his own 
laws, and he hath published certain restrictions on this 
law . . . . [T]o construe that law to Noah strictly, is 
only to gratify a blood thirsty revenge, without any of 
those allowances for human frailties which the law of 





130. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 288. 
131. Id. at 284 (“[I]t may not be improper, considering what has in the course of 
this year been advanced, published, and industriously propagated among the peo-
ple, to observe to you that none of the indictments against the prisoners are found-
ed on the act of this province, or the law given to the Jews, but that, all of the in-
dictments are at common law.  The prisoners are charged with having offended 
against the common law, and that only; by that law therefore they are to be judged, 
and by that law condemned, or else they must be acquitted.”). See also id. at 288  
(“[T]hese rules of the common law, are the result of the wisdom and experience of 
many ages.  However, it is not material in the present case, whether the common 
law is agreeable to, or variant from, the law given to the Jews, because it is certain, 
the prisoners are not in this Court to be tried by that law, but by the common law, 
that is according to the settled and established rules, and antient customs of the 
nation, approved for successions of ages.”). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 304. 
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The contention at the heart of Whitman’s analysis, that reasona-
ble doubt emerged to aid convictions by salving jurors’ souls terri-
fied of wrongly convicting, is simply not supported by the Boston 
Massacre trials.  Whatever effect that spiritual anxiety had on the 
standard’s development in England, it does not seem to have had that 
effect on the first known use of the standard, which was in America.  
Instead, the spiritual anxiety at work when the standard was first 
articulated was just the opposite—that God-fearing jurors would feel 
religiously compelled to condemn, even if the facts and the applica-
ble law did not support a conviction.  The judicial concern in the 
Boston Massacre trials was that religion would produce an unreason-
ing conviction, not an acquittal.  
D.  The Reasonable Doubt Instruction as an Aid to Acquittals 
The conclusion that the purpose of the first known articulation of 
the reasonable doubt standard was to aid convictions comes by pars-
ing some trial participants’ words.  John Adams’ summation told the 
jury, “[T]he best rule in doubtful cases, is, rather to incline to acquit-
tal than conviction . . . . Where you are doubtful never act; that is, if 
you doubt of the prisoners guilt, never declare him guilty; that is al-
ways the rule, especially in cases of life.”134 
The prosecutor, Robert Treat Paine, seemingly responded by 
stating that English law was benign, a proposition which could best 
be understood by Coke’s observation that the law was  
 
the last improvement of Reason which in the nature of 
it will not admitt any Proposition to be true of which . 
. . there remains a doubt; if therefor in the examina-
tion of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient to 
Convince beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guilt of all 
or any of the Prisoners by the Benignity and Reason 
of the Law you will acquit them, but if the Evidence 
be sufficient to convince you of their Guilt beyond 
reasonable Doubt the Justice of the Law will require 
you to declare them Guilty and the Benignity of the 
  
134. John Adams, Adams’ Argument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, supra 
note 26, at 243. 
File: Jonakait - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V4 Created on: 6/1/2012 1:57:00 PM Last Printed: 6/1/2012 2:00:00 PM 









Anthony Morano concluded that Adams was stating the existing 
law.  The jury should “acquit if it doubted that the defendant was 
guilty.”136  Paine, in reply, however, was making a “novel plea” that 
a doubt compelling an acquittal had to be reasonable.
137
  Thus, Paine 
was urging the replacement of an any doubt standard with the rea-
sonable doubt standard, and in Morano’s version, Paine’s midwifery 
had some success.  “Paine’s innovation did influence one justice to 
break with tradition.”138  Justice Oliver instructed the jury that “if 
upon the whole, ye are in any reasonable doubt of their guilt, ye 
must then, agreeable to the rule of law, declare them innocent.”139 
Whitman finds Paine not so much an innovator, but an importer, 
bringing an idea into the law that had long been accepted elsewhere.  
Paine was expressing “the basic tension between certainty and doubt 
[that] had been intimately associated with moral theology for centu-
ries . . . .”140  Paine was merely enunciating the “safer path theology” 
going back more than a century.141  “That literature held that doubts 
that had to be obeyed were those that conformed to ‘reason.’  Indeed, 
the moralist literature had insisted for a hundred years that qualms of 
conscience not be allowed prevent the satisfactory workings of pub-
lic justice.”142 
If Whitman is correct that it was well accepted that doubts had to 
conform to reason, then Adams may have been saying the same 
thing as Paine.  Adams’ “doubt” may have been synonymous with 
Paine’s “reasonable doubt.”  If so, this reasonable doubt standard 
was not something new, invented to aid the prosecution, but just an-
other formulation for what already existed.  
  
135. Robert Treat Paine, Paine’s Argument for the Crown, in ADAMS PAPERS, 
supra note 26, at 271. 
136. Morano, supra note 11, at 517. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 518. 
139. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 
140. WHITMAN, supra note 11, at 194. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 193. 
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What we can be reasonably certain about, however, is that no 
matter what Adams and Paine meant, the judge who gave that first 
known reasonable doubt charge was not giving a charge to make 
convictions easier.  While Justice Oliver’s language about reasona-
ble doubt might appear as prosecution friendly if it is viewed in iso-
lation, it does not when viewed in its context.  The jury instructions 
containing the reasonable doubt charge were not pro-prosecution 
but, really, commands to acquit. 
The prosecution had faced the difficulty that no witness had testi-
fied as to which particular soldier killed three of the victims.143  The 
prosecutor offered two theories why, even so, each defendant was 
still guilty of murder.144  First, Paine contended that the soldiers were 
an unlawful assembly, and each soldier was responsible for the as-
sembly’s deeds.145  Paine also maintained that each defendant was 
liable as a principal if the defendant aided, assisted, and abetted an-
other to do an unlawful act.
146
  Paine urged that the rapid firing sup-
ported the aiding and abetting theory because it indicated a prior 
agreement to shoot.  And even if the shooting did not show that, it 
was evidence of abetting “as one by firing encourages the others to 
do the like.”147 
Justice Trowbridge, who gave the first set of instructions, in es-
sence told the jury to reject Paine’s arguments.  The rapid firing did 





143.See Robert Treat Paine, Paine’s Argument for the Crown, in Adams Papers, 
supra note 26, at 279. 
144.  Id. 
145. See id. (“But which of the other 5 prisoners killed the other 3 of the deceased 
appears very uncertain.  But this operates nothing in their favour if it appears to 
you what they were an unlawful Assembly for it has been abundantly proved to 
you by Numerous Authoritys produced by the Council for the Prisoners, that every 
individual of an Unlawful Assembly is answerable for the doings [of] the rest.”).   
146. See id. (“[A]ll that are present aiding assisting and abetting to the doing an 
unlawful act as is charged in the Several Indictments against the Prisoners are also 
considered as Principals.”). 
147. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 297. 
148. See id. (“The Council for the Crown insist, that the firing upon the people 
was an unlawful act, in disturbance of the peace, and as the party fired so near 
together, it must be supposed they previously agreed to do it; that agreement made 
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If each of the party had been at the same instant so 
assaulted, as that it would have justified his killing 
the assailant in defence of his own life, and there-
upon each of them had at that same instant fired up-
on and killed that person assaulted him, surely it 
would not have been evidence of a previous agree-
ment to fire, or prove them to be an unlawful assem-
bly . . . .
149
   
 
Even if, the Justice continued, that provocation only mitigated mur-
der to manslaughter, the rapid shooting would not indicate a prior 
agreement or an unlawful assembly.
150
  Then, Trowbridge stressed 
that there was plenty of evidence of an assault that explained the 
rapid firing.   
 
You will therefore carefully consider what the sever-
al witnesses have sworn, with regard to the assault 
made upon the party of soldiers at the Custom house, 
and if you thereupon believe they were, before, and 
at the time of, their firing attacked by such numbers, 
and in such a violent manner, as many of the wit-
nesses have positively sworn, you will be able to as-
sign a cause for their firing so near together, as they 





The judge addressed whether the shooting by one aided and abet-
ted the others by pointing out that since no soldier fired more than 
  
them an unlawful assembly, if they were not so before, and being so when they 
fired, all are chargeable with the killing by any one or more of them.  However 
just this reasoning may be, where there is no apparent cause for their firing, yet it 
will not hold good where there is.”).   
149. Id. 
150. See id. (“nor would it have been evidence of such agreement though the at-
tack was not as would justify the firing and killing, if it was such an assault as 
would alleviate the offence, and reduce it to manslaughter, since there would be as 
apparent a cause of the firing in one case as in the other . . . .”).  
151. Id. 
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once, the one who fired last could not by that act have encouraged 
those who fired before.
152
  Furthermore, Trowbridge told the jury 
that a defendant did not unlawfully abet if he had a proper justifica-
tion for shooting,
153
 and the same held even if the provocation only 
mitigated a killing to manslaughter.
154
  He then stressed that soldiers 
not proven to have aided or abetted others could only be convicted if 
it were proved that a specific soldier killed a particular person.
155
  
There was only that kind of proof about two of the five victims and 
two of the defendants.  Thus, this instruction told the jurors that they 
should acquit all but two of the defendants if the soldiers had been 
under an attack that allowed for self-defense or mitigated a murder 
to manslaughter.  Finally, the judge, who had already pointed out the 
many witnesses who had testified to such provocation, dismissed 
any notion that a jury could not find such an attack.
156
  These jury 
instructions were, therefore, in essence a command to acquit six of 
the eight defendants.  Trowbridge said, “And as the evidence does 
not shew which three killed the three, nor that either of the six in 
particular killed either of the three, you cannot find the either of the 
six guilty of killing them or either [of] them.”157  
  
152. See id. (“As neither of the soldiers fired more than once, it is evident that he 
who fired last, could not thereby in fact, abet or encourage the firing of any of 
those who fired before him, and so it cannot be evidence of such abetment.”). 
153. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 297–98 (“And if he who fired first and killed, 
can justify it, because it was lawful for him so to do, surely that same lawful act 
cannot be evidence of an unlawful abetment.”). 
154. See id. at 298 (“[Y]et if it appears he had such a cause for the killing as will 
reduce it to Manslaughter, it would be strange indeed if the same act should be 
evidence of his abetting another who killed without provocation, so as to make 
him who fired first guilty of murder.  The same may be said as to all the interme-
diate firings . . . .”). 
155. See id. (If the soldiers were a lawful assembly and did not unlawfully abet 
each, “they cannot be said to have in consideration of law killed those five persons 
or either of them, but must rest on the evidence of the actual killing: and, if so, 
neither of the prisoners can be found guilty thereof, unless it appears not that he 
was of the party, but that he in particular in fact did kill one or more of the persons 
slain.”). 
156. See id. (“[A]nd as the evidence stands, I don’t think it necessary to say how it 
would be in case the first person fired with little or no provocation.”). 
157. Id. 
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Prosecution evidence, however, showed that William Montgom-
ery and Matthew Killroy each killed a particular victim.  Justice 
Trowbridge stated that a murder conviction for those two was proper 
only if they had fired without first being assaulted.  If there had been 
an assault that had immediately threatened the soldiers’ lives and 
they fired to preserve their safety, they should be acquitted.  If the 
assault did not place the soldiers’ lives in danger, then a verdict of 
manslaughter was appropriate.  Trowbridge continued by stressing 
that evidence allowed the jury to find self-defense,
158
 and the evi-
dence definitely allowed for no more than a manslaughter convic-
tion.  He said:    
 
But you must know, that if this part of soldiers in 
general were pelted, with snow-balls, pieces of ice 
and sticks, in anger, this, without more, amounts to 
an assault, not upon those that were in fact struck, 
but upon the whole party; and is such an assault as 




This was not an instruction offering a spiritually safe path that 
led to a conviction for a blood punishment.  Instead, these were in-
structions that almost commanded an acquittal of murder.  Of course, 
Trowbridge is not the judge who gave the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion.  Justice Oliver did, but Oliver’s charge, which primarily adopt-
ed Trowbridge’s remarks, sought even more than the earlier instruc-
tions to have acquittals of all charges. 
Oliver started by castigating those in the community who had 
sought to prejudice the defendants,
160
 and urged the jury “to divest 
your minds of every thing that may tend to bias them in this 
  
158. See id. (If you believe some of the witnesses, “it will be sufficient to show, 
that his life was in immediate danger, or that he had sufficient reason to think 
so.”). 
159. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at  299. 
160. Oliver specifically referred to a newspaper article, which also insulted the 
court, and said,  “I think I never saw a greater malignity of heart expressed in any 
one piece.” Id. at 302. 
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cause.”161  He then said that because of Justice Trowbridge’s thor-
oughness, he had little to add to the homicide definitions,
162
 and rec-
ommended that the jurors first consider whether the soldiers or those 
confronting the soldiers were an unlawful assembly.163  His summary 
stressed the lack of doubt on a key issue:  
 
It would be too tedious to recite the numbers of tes-
timonies to prove a design to attack the soldiers . . . 
there are no less than thirty-eight witnesses to this 
fact, six of whom the council for the King have pro-
duced.  Compare them Gentlemen, and then deter-
mine whether or not there is any room to doubt of 
the numbers collected around the soldiers at the 
Custom house, being a riotous assembly.
164
   
 
Evidence instead showed that the crowd had committed provoca-
tive acts that justified the firing.
165
  He, again, echoed Trowbridge by 
noting that the lack of proof as to which particular defendant killed 
three of the victims was an evidentiary absence that required acquit-
tals.  “[T]his maxim of law cannot be more justly applied, than in 
this case, viz. That it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than one 
innocent suffer . . . .”166   
Oliver conceded that Montgomery had killed one of the victims.  
While Trowbridge left open the possibility of a manslaughter con-
viction for that soldier, Oliver indicated that Montgomery should be 
  
161. Id. at 303. 
162. See id. (“I should have given to you the definitions of the different species of 
homicide, but as my brother hath spoke so largely upon this subject, and hath pro-
duced so many and so indisputable authorities relative thereto, I would not exhaust 
your patience which hath so remarkably held out during this long trial.”). 
163. Id. at 304 (“I would recommend to you, Gentlemen, in order to your forming 
a just verdict in this cause, to satisfy yourselves in the first place, whether or not 
the prisoners at the bar were an unlawful assembly when they were at the Custom-
house, for on that much depends their guilt or innocence.”) 
164. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at  306. 
165. Id. at 307–08. 
166. Id. at 308. 
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totally acquitted.167  Oliver asserted that the attacks on Montgomery 
provided a legal justification for the killing.168  “[H]ere take the 
words and the blows together, and then say, whether this firing was 
not justifiable.”169  He concluded his evidence summary by down-
playing the importance of the proof against Killroy.
170
  Oliver, as he 




Oliver’s reasonable doubt instruction came after this recital of 
the reasons why all should be acquitted.  He said that if the jury 
found that the soldiers were acting lawfully and only fired when  
 
there was a necessity to do it in their own defence, 
which I think there is a violent presumption of: and if, 
on the other hand, ye should find that the people who 
were collected around the soldiers, were an unlawful 
assembly, and had a design to endanger, if not take 
away their lives, as seems to be evident, from blows 
succeeding threatnings; ye must, in such case acquit 
the prisoners; or if upon the whole, ye are in any rea-
sonable doubt of their guilt, ye must then, agreeable 
to the rule of law, declare them innocent.
172
   
 
  
167. See id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 308–09. 
171. In this portion of his charge where he urged a complete acquittal, Oliver was 
acting as he had in the Richardson trial.  See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 224–25 
(explaining that the judges “agreed that Richardson, having acted in self-defense, 
could be held for nothing more than manslaughter . . . . Oliver went farther than 
the other judges; Richardson, he said, had committed no offense at all, not even 
manslaughter.”).  Opprobrium was heaped upon Oliver for his role in the Richard-
son trial, which drew the judge’s comment in the Preston trial.  Oliver “also re-
minded the [Preston] jury of the contempt he had personally received during Rich-
ardson’s trial.”  Id. at 265. 
172. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 
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Justice Oliver, a Royalist and Tory, opposed to what he saw as 
the Boston mob,
173
 did not mention reasonable doubt to aid the pros-
ecution.  Oliver’s instructions stated that there was a “violent pre-
sumption” in favor of justification, but even if the jurors did not 
agree with what was “evident,” that the defendants had proved self-
defense, the jurors still had to acquit if the jurors had a reasonable 
doubt about their guilt.174  The reasonable doubt instruction was not 
given to make a conviction easier, but was another arrow that told 
the jury that they should acquit.175 
VI. REASONABLE DOUBT AS ENLIGHTENMENT THINKING 
Barbara Shapiro and James Franklin present accounts of the rea-
sonable doubt’s development that are similar to each others and dif-
fer from Whitman’s.  In their views, the true driving force for the 
rule’s evolution came not from concerns over blood punishments, 
but instead from a complex interrelationship between legal develop-
ments and the epistemological advances in other disciplines, includ-
ing religion, philosophy, and science.
176
  These disciplines all shared 
a concern with determining when knowledge derived from the sens-
es “yield conclusions which were sufficiently true to serve as the 
basis for conduct of human affairs.”177   
The legal system first led the way.  Franklin, in The Science of 
Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, notes that sev-
enteenth century English law rejected the rigid notion that facts 
could be established by merely using presumptions or adding togeth-
  
173. See ZOBEL, supra note 26, at 4 (“the Tory Peter Oliver”); see also id. at 4 
(“Royalist”).  
174. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 309. 
175. Id. 
176. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE 
CAUSE” 2 (1991) (“[T]he judges confronted twin sources of epistemological guid-
ance.  One was the English religious tradition, particularly the casuistical tradition, 
which sought a rational method of decision making in everyday life.  The other 
was the scientific movement of Bacon, Boyle, and especially Locke and the empir-
ical philosophers, who sought to establish scientific truth from the evidence they 
gathered.”). 
177. Id. at 7. 
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  Instead, that law recognized that trial proof was 
a matter of probabilities and that facts could not be established with 
absolute certainty or without doubt.  Even so, a high degree of cer-
tainty could and should be demanded.  Shapiro states that this Eng-
lish legal culture was “a widely admired mode of establishing correct 
beliefs in the world of ‘fact.’  During the early modern era the Eng-
lish legal system had produced a well-accepted epistemological 
framework and a method of implementing it that worked reasonably 
well in reaching judgments of ‘fact’ necessary to make important 
social decisions.”179  Because this jury system was highly regarded 
in English society, other fields took note of the methods for reaching 
“moral certainty” in the legal field.180  While the nomenclature var-
ied among the disciplines, they all concluded that “[t]here were three 
subcategories of knowledge, each possessing a different kind of cer-
tainty: physical, derived from immediate sense data; mathematical, 
established by logical demonstration such as the proofs in geometry; 
and moral, based on testimony and secondhand reports of sense da-
ta.”181  In this last category, knowledge could not be absolutely 
proved but still could be raised to a level much above mere opinion 
and form the basis for human conduct.
182
  “All the discourses of fact 
  
178. See JAMES FRANKLIN, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND 
PROBABILITY BEFORE PASCAL 62 (2001) (“[S]ubtle distinctions among grades of 
presumptions, and fractions of proof, were ill adapted to explanation to juries.”). 
179. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 32. 
180. “[T]he absorption and spread of ‘fact’ in England was facilitated by wide-
spread familiarity with and esteem for lay fact finding juries.  Efforts by natural-
ists, historians, rationalizing theologians, and even novelists to rely on the credible 
testimony of firsthand witnesses thus built and were assisted by an already exist-
ing, legitimate, widely shared, and often glorified cultural practice.”  See id. at 
209.  For example, a basic principle of the judicial system spread, and “[a]ll the 
fact-oriented disciplines exhibited a preference for personal observation and a 
belief that the testimony of credible witnesses under optimum conditions could 
yield believable, even morally certain ‘facts.’”  Id. at 211. 
181. SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 7–8.  Cf  id. at 41 (“[T]here are two realms of 
human knowledge. In one it is possible to obtain the absolute certainty of mathe-
matical demonstration . . . .  In the other, which is the empirical realm of events, 
absolute certainty of this kind is not possible.”).  
182. See id. at 7 (“The attempt to build an intermediate level of knowledge, short 
of absolute certainty but above the level of mere opinion, was made by an over-
lapping group of theologians and naturalists.”);  see also id. at 41 (“[J]ust because 
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emphasized the quest for evidence of facts sufficient to reach ‘moral 
certainty.’”183   
A crucial step in reasonable doubt’s emergence was the devel-
opment of the “satisfied conscience” test, which, according to 
Shapiro, was the first English legal standard explicitly used for the 
evaluation of facts and testimony.
184
  The concept came from the 
English Protestant tradition that “insisted that the conscience in-
volved an act of the intellect, not the will . . . [, and] each person to 
be his own strictest judge.  The judgment of conscience thus could 
not involve deferring to the authority or the wishes of another per-
son.”185  
This English religious tradition was concerned with the overly 
scrupulous conscience since such a “doubtful conscience which sub-
stituted excessive suspicion for care would never find itself at 
rest.”186  Conscience, however, was a product of rationality and un-
derstanding and not of the passions or feelings.  Since conscience 
was a product of reason,
187
 however, a person seeking the solace of a 
right conscience did not have to reach mathematical certainty.  A 
satisfied conscience was achieved if the conscience was without rea-
sonable or rational doubt.  Shapiro says that the connection between 
the English religious formulations and the later legal development of 
  
absolute certainty is not possible, we ought not to treat everything merely as a 
guess or opinion.  Instead, in this realm there are levels of certainty, and we reach 
higher levels of certainty as the quantity and quality of evidence available to us 
increase.”). 
183. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 211.  See also id. at 46–47 (“History and law both 
were disciplines committed to determining the truth of past events . . . .  In history 
as in law, moral certainty was the highest certainty available for matters of fact.”). 
184. See SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 13, 14 (“The ‘satisfied conscience’ standard 
became the first vessel into which were poured the new criteria for evaluating facts 
and testimony. . . . Satisfied conscience is central to the development of the be-
yond reasonable doubt standard.”).  See also id. at 41 (“The earliest standards we 
have identified were ‘satisfied belief’ and ‘satisfied conscience.’”). 
185. Id. at 15. 
186. Id. at 16. 
187. See id. at 16 (“It is important for us to emphasize that the judgment of con-
science was a rational decision . . . . [Religious figures] repeatedly insisted that 
conscience is a function of the understanding, not the passions. To go against con-
science is to go against reason.”).  
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reasonable doubt can be seen in the words of Robert South, an An-
glican cleric who, like others,  
 
insisted that mathematical certainty of demonstration 
was not necessary in order to be assured of the right-
ness of one’s conscience.  It was sufficient ‘if he 
know it upon the grounds of a convincing probability, 
as shall exclude all rational grounds of doubting it.’  
The language of rational or reasonable doubt was thus 
part of the language of the right and sure conscience 




This notion of conscience spread from moral theology to philos-
ophy and science where it appeared most notably in the thinking of 
John Locke, who “links conscience with the understanding, not pas-
sions.”189  Locke’s work had a central role in formulating the philo-
sophical concept of fact,
190
 and he drew on legal processes to ad-
vance his arguments.
191
  The crucial insight of this Enlightenment 
age, as embodied in the work of Locke and others, was that 
knowledge could be advanced not merely through deductive thought, 
but also by induction; that knowledge could be gained not merely 
through mathematical logic, but also by applying reason to experi-
ence.  
 
The inductive approach, based ultimately on experi-
ence, had a special appeal in the age of Enlighten-
ment.  Basically, it implied an experiential test of 
knowledge or of system, the same kind of criterion of 
truth that in the sciences had become Newton’s ‘Proof 
  
188. Id. at 16–17 (quoting HENRY R. MCADOO, THE STRUCTURE OF CAROLINE 
MORAL THEOLOGY 77 (1949) (quoting Robert South, WORKS, sermon 23 (Oxford, 
1828).).   
189. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 17. 
190. See id. at 189 (“Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding (1690) played a 
central role in generalizing the concept of fact and giving it philosophical form and 
status.”). 
191. Id. at 191 (For Locke, “[l]egal practice and concepts clearly had philosophi-
cal application.”). 
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The intellectual flow between law and the other disciplines re-
versed.
193
  “During the seventeenth century, legal concepts played an 
important role in shaping empirical philosophy.  Now empirical phi-
losophy as formulated by Locke and his successors came to influ-
ence legal writing, creating a symbiosis between epistemology and 
the law of evidence.”194  For example, the first legal treatise on evi-
dence appeared in 1754.  This work, written by Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, 
who also wrote an abstract of Locke’s work, presented the law of 
evidence in a Lockean framework.  “The rules of evidence did not 
change substantially with Gilbert.  Instead of appearing as a series of 
ad hoc professional norms, however, they are now presented as built 
on a sound and systematic epistemological foundation,” which drew 
on the formulations of Locke and others.
195
 
When English judges started to formulate rules or burdens for re-
solving disputed matters of fact, according to Shapiro they turned to 
the other intellectual fields that were already developing or accepting 
such standards.  As a result, the law concluded that “[w]hen the . . . 
jurors reached a state of a ‘satisfied conscience’ or ‘moral certainty,’ 
conviction was appropriate.”196  These two terms were synony-
  
192. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, JOHN ADAMS 
& JAMES MADISON 58 (1995). 
193. See SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 214 (“If the direction of influence in the sev-
enteenth century ran from law to natural history, it appears to have reversed in 
later centuries as writers on legal evidence began to draw on the authority of scien-
tific fact finding.”). Cf. FRANKLIN, supra note 178, at 365 (“By 1700 law had 
served its purpose for the mathematical theory of probability.  The service was 
never returned.  Legal probability has continued to exist, and it is accepted in legal 
theory that such notions as proof beyond reasonable doubt involve probability.  
But all attempts to quantify the concept have been resisted.”). 
194. SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 193.  See also id. at 192 (“Locke’s Conduct of the 
Understanding perhaps provides the best summary of my argument for the appro-
priation of legal and historical fact determination by the virtuosi. . . .”). 
195. Id. at 193. 
196. Id. at 23. 
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 and judges also used related formulations that were meant 
to convey the same standard.
198
  But, the satisfied conscience and 





Over time judges became increasingly likely to men-
tion doubts on the part of the jury.   From the mid-
eighteenth century the now familiar ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’ terminology of modern Anglo-American 
law was added to its cognates, ‘satisfied conscience’ 
and ‘moral certainty.’  The meaning of all these 
phrases was identical and they were used together.
200
   
 
In contrast to the assertion that the reasonable doubt rule was a 
new standard that made convictions easier by replacing an any doubt 
rule that permitted acquittals based on irrational or frivolous beliefs 
or feelings, Shapiro maintains reasonable doubt was merely a new 
formulation for the well-settled test.   
 
The term ‘moral certainty’ was taken to mean proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  If one had real doubts, 
moral certainty was not reached.  The term ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ was, I believe, not a replacement 
  
197. See id. at 23 (“The ‘satisfied conscience’ standard was synonymous with the 
term ‘moral certainty.’”). 
198. See id. (“Late-seventeenth-century judges often used expressions such as ‘if 
you are satisfied or not satisfied with the evidence’ or ‘if you believe on the evi-
dence.’ . . . During the early eighteenth century there was increasing reference to 
the understanding of jurors. . . . Understanding and conscience were concerned 
with the same mental processes.”);  see also SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 20 (Early 
cases used a satisfied conscience formulation, but this satisfaction came “only 
when the reasoning faculties were exercised upon the evidence.” Over time, courts 
referred less to conscience and more to mind and belief.  “A guilty verdict was 
appropriate if the jurors ‘believed,’ an acquittal if they were not ‘satisfied.’”). 
199. See SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 23 (When jurors “entertained reasonable 
doubts, they were to acquit.”). 
200. See id.;  see also SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 20 (illustrating that the concept 
that jurors should convict only if “satisfied” or “fully satisfied” continued. “The 
requirement that the jury be ‘fully satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ on the basis of the evi-
dence continues as a common feature.”).  
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for the any doubt test but was added to clarify the no-
tions of moral certainty and satisfied belief. . . .  Rea-
sonable doubt was simply a better explanation of the 
satisfied conscience standard that resulted from in-





Franklin essentially agrees with Shapiro that the reasonable doubt 
concept had been the foundation of the law long before that term 
emerged.  Franklin summarizes:  
 
Eventually all probabilistic concepts in English law 
were reduced to one word, reasonable.  The com-
mon understanding that the standard of proof in 
criminal trials should lie somewhere between suspi-
cion and complete certainty came to be expressed 
solely in the formula ‘proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’  Gradually, any question on the evidential re-
lation between facts became expressible in terms of 
what the reasonable man would think.
202
   
 
The reasonable doubt formulation may have emerged around 
1770, but the idea it expressed was the same as that contained in 
“moral certainty,”203 and that centuries-old moral-certainty term 
meant, as did the reasonable doubt standard which replaced it, to “a 
very high but not complete degree of persuasion.”204  The reasonable 
  
201. SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 21.  See also id. at 41 (“The highest level of 
certainty in this empirical realm was called . . . ‘moral certainty,’ a certainty which 
there was no reason to doubt.”). 
202. FRANKLIN, supra note 178, at 62–63. 
203. See id. at 366 (“From around 1770, English law adopted the phrase ‘proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt’ (originally defined as equivalent to ‘moral certainty’) 
for the standard of proof required in a criminal case.”). 
204. Id. at 69 (“Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris around 1400 . . . 
seems to have been the first to introduce the term, occasionally still heard in Eng-
lish, ‘moral certainty’ . . . to mean a very high but not complete degree of persua-
sion.”); see also id. at 371 (“Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 defines probability as 
‘Likelihood; appearance of truth; evidence arising from the preponderation of 
argument: it is less than a moral certainty’ . . . . ”). 
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doubt standard, then, did not make convictions easier by replacing 
the any doubt standard.  Instead, reasonable doubt was just another 
formulation of a long-utilized standard that did not demand absolute 
certainty but did require a strong certitude based on reason. 
VII. JURY REFORMS, NOT FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT, BUT FROM 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
George Fisher’s historical study of the jury’s role in determining 
truth, however, casts a dubious eye on the assertion that epistemo-
logical advances in such fields as science, philosophy, and religion 
fueled jury developments.  Instead, jury reforms were “the product 
of political conflict, not intellectual growth.”205   
As an example, Fisher cites the notorious treason trials in late 
seventeenth century England, where convictions were obtained 
through perjury.  Parliament responded by providing treason defend-
ants rights that the common law had not granted, including the au-
thority to call sworn witnesses.  Fisher concludes that the lawmakers 
did not primarily adopt the reforms because of any new intellectual 
outlook.  He states:  
 
It is true that an evolving epistemology of the sort 
that Barbara Shapiro describes, which could deal 
more comfortably with conflicting evidence in the 
courtroom, might have given the Parliamentarians 
courage in the change they undertook. . . . But for the 
religious strife and consequent spate of treason trials 
of the late Stuart reigns, and but for the sufferings 
that notorious perjurers . . . inflicted on eminent men 
of both political persuasions, Parliament would not 
have granted criminal defendants the right to call 
sworn witnesses at the end of the seventeenth centu-





205. See generally Fisher, supra note 56, at 615.  
206. Id. at 623–24. 
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Fisher does not suggest that every change in jury practice resulted 
from a particular political controversy,
207
 but the underlying force 
for reform was not advancing epistemologies.  Instead, changes were 
made to keep the jury system appearing legitimate.
208
 
Whitman’s views to some extent coincide with the notion that a 
legitimacy concern brought changes to the jury.  He sees the reason-
able doubt standard emerging to counter the increasing illegitimacy 
that the system faced from wrongful acquittals.  On the other hand, 
as we have seen, nothing indicates that the American jury system 
was under attack because the guilty were being acquitted.
209
  As the 
“constitutionalization” of jury trials indicates, juries in America were 
seen as essential.  Furthermore, Fisher’s history has the jury’s legit-
imacy questioned because of wrongful convictions, not acquittals, 
with the response that more rights were granted to defendants, not 
more powers to the prosecution. 
Fisher may be right about abrupt changes in the system, especial-
ly those coming through statutes.  Such reforms may have had spe-
cific causes that produced political pressures, but the forces underly-
ing evolutionary changes, such as the formulations of the burden of 
proof, are not as readily identifiable and are, no doubt, more subtle.  
Epistemological advances permeating society can be important forc-
es for such transformations even if the intellectual developments 
have not left unambiguous blazes on the legal trail.  
VIII. AMERICAN REASONABLE DOUBT AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
THINKING 
Shapiro and Franklin’s accounts largely focus on developments 
in England, but their views also lead to an explanation for reasonable 
doubt’s first articulation across the Atlantic.  Enlightenment thought 
  
207. See id. at 703 (“It would be foolish to argue that each of these trends and 
events traces to a political or social controversy that operated outside the justice 
system.”). 
208. See id. at 704 (“I suggest that the most substantial force behind this enor-
mous historical trend has been the system’s concern with its own apparent legiti-
macy.”); see also id. at 705 (“The jury . . . promised a remarkably reliable source 
of systemic legitimacy.”). 
209. See supra text at Part IV.A–G. 
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pervaded eighteenth century America.  Bernard Cohen, in Science 
and the Founding Fathers, points out that  
 
the American nation was conceived in a historical 
period that is generally known as the Enlighten-
ment, or the great Age of Reason, and science was 
then generally esteemed as the highest expression of 
human rationality. . . .  It is simply inconceivable 
that thinking men and women of the eighteenth cen-
tury would be uninfluenced by the ideals, the con-
cepts, the principles, and even the laws of the sci-
ence that Newton created or by other achievements 
in the physical and life sciences and medicine.
210
   
 
Cohen contends that the inductive approach to knowledge of science 
was especially attractive to Americans.   
 
The constant regard for the lessons of experience 
had to be significant to citizens of the New World in 
a way that was not the case for Europeans, simply 
because in the New World there was a conscious-
ness of a frontier, even for those who lived in urban 
centers or on farms and plantations far removed 
from the boundaries of the wilderness and the do-
mains of the Indians.  Woe to anyone who was so 
wedded to theory or abstractions as to neglect the 
hard facts of brute experience.
211
   
 
Certainly many eighteenth century Americans had knowledge of 
the twin beacons of the Enlightenment, John Locke and Isaac New-
ton.
212
  This came through formal education,
213
 but the knowledge 
  
210. COHEN, supra note 192, at 20. 
211. Id. at 57–58. 
212. See id. at 59 (“Two great intellectual heroes of that age were the philosopher 
John Locke and the scientist Isaac Newton, sometimes called the ‘twin luminaries’ 
of the Augustan Age.”). 
213. See id. at 99 (“All students of science in the days of Jefferson’s youth would 
have studied Newton’s Opticks . . . . [T]he Opticks was literally a handbook of the 
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spread further because this was an American age that saw scientific 
findings being regularly reported in newspapers and presented in 
popular demonstrations and lectures.
214
 
Perhaps the strongest indication that Enlightenment precepts had 
permeated the society is that eighteenth century Americans could 
make references to the thinking of Newton and Locke without expli-
cation.  It was simply assumed that the audience would understand.  
For example, James Wilson, in his legal lectures, argued that society 
should be able to change its constitution.  He addressed the conten-
tion that an alterable constitution could lead to political instability by 
stating: 
 
The very reverse will be its effect.  Let the uninter-
rupted power to change be admitted and fully under-
stood, and the exercise of it will not lightly or wan-
tonly assumed.  There is a vis intertiae in publick 
bodies as well as in matter; and, if left to their natu-
ral propensities, they will not be moved without a 
proportioned propelling cause.
215
   
 
Wilson was referring, without further explanation, to the Newtonian 
principle that a body at rest remains that way without an external 
force.
216
  Cohen says about this passage:   
 
It is, I believe, significant that Wilson did not find a 
need for an explicit reference to Newton or for a 
mention of the Principia by name.  He apparently as-
sumed that his audience would be sufficiently 
  
method of experiment, showing not only how to devise and perform experiments, 
but also how to draw conclusions from them.”). 
214. Id. at 181 (“This was an age of great general interest in science, a subject 
reported regularly in the newspapers and brought to the attention of the curious 
through popular lectures and demonstrations.”). 
215. WILSON, supra note 83, at 305. 
216. See COHEN, supra note 192, at 36 (Wilson was “using Definition Three of 
Newton’s Principia, in which Newton introduced the concept of ‘vis Intertiae,’ or 
‘force of inertia,’ an ‘inherent’ force that exists in every variety of matter that 
causes a body to resist any change in its state of rest or motion.”). 
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schooled in the Newtonian natural philosophy to 
recognize the source of his analogy.217 
 
The work of Jonathan Edwards further indicates the reach of En-
lightenment principles in eighteenth century America.  Edwards, 
who read widely in the philosophers and scientists of the age, 
“sought to reconcile piety with the new scientific and philosophical 
age demarcated by Newton and Locke.”218  His sermons, which no 
doubt reached many societal strata, contained reference to Newton 
and Locke by name with little or no exegesis of what they said.
219
  
Edwards simply assumed that the congregants would understand. 
Americans “believed science to be a supreme expression of hu-
man reason.”220  The sound methods of science could not only help 
explain the present world and make accurate predictions, 
221
 they, as 
trials seek to do, “could also retrodict past events . . . .”222  In this 
culture, it would have been remarkable if the standards used to gauge 
scientific testimony and witnesses did not affect the standards used 
to assess trial proceedings.
223
 
The effect of Enlightenment insights on American legal thinking 
are revealed when James Wilson’s legal lectures turned to the topic 
of obtaining knowledge from human affairs.  Wilson started with the 
distinction that “evidence, which arises from reasoning, is divided 
into two species—demonstrative and moral.”224  Demonstrative evi-
dence concerns abstract truths that are unchangeable.  In this realm, 
  
217. Id. at 38.  Similarly, Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia incorporates rules 
obtained from Newton without finding “a need to mention either the name of 
Newton or the title of his book. [Jefferson] assumed that Newton’s rules were so 
well known to his readers that to mention either Newton’s name or the title of his 
treatise would be supererogatory, a breech of good taste in rhetoric.”  Id. at 76–77. 
218. John E. Smith et al., Introduction to JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra 
note 58, at viii. 
219. See  JONATHAN EDWARDS READER, supra note 58, at 15, 194, 205, and 206. 
220. COHEN, supra note 192, at 279. 
221. See id. (“Science . . . represented knowledge that was certain. . . .  Scientific 
knowledge was based on sound method . . . .”). 
222. Id. 
223. See id. at 60 (“In an age in which reason was venerated, science was es-
teemed as the intellectual manifestation of human reason in action.”). 
224. WILSON, supra note 86, at 395. 
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there are no degrees, and demonstrations may vary in their ease of 
comprehension, but they cannot be opposed to each other.  “If one 
demonstration can be refuted, it must be by another demonstration: 
but to suppose that two contrary demonstrations can exist, is to sup-
pose that the same proposition is both true and false: which is mani-
festly absurd.”225 
Other truths, however, are not demonstrative, but moral.  In this 
realm, conflicting proof can, and usually does, exist.  “On both sides, 
contrary presumptions, contrary testimonies, contrary experiences 
must be balanced. . . . Moral evidence is generally complicated: it 
depends not upon any one argument, but upon many independent 
proofs, which, however, combine their strength, and draw on the 
same conclusion.”226  A factual matter is not an area of absolute 
truth, but of probabilities that can lead to moral certainty.  “In moral 
evidence, we rise, by an insensible gradation, from possibility to 
probability, and from probability to the highest degree of moral cer-
tainty.”227  Wilson clearly did not see moral certainty as a merely 
legal construct; it applied to all of human knowledge, and when it 
reached the highest level, it produced a certainty equivalent to that of 
demonstrative proof.
228
  What is important here is that Wilson’s ap-
  
225. Id. at 396. 
226. Id. 
227. Id.  Wilson also stated that when a consequence follows an object, the mind 
begins to anticipate that result when the object occurs.  He continued: 
If the consequences have followed the object constantly, and the observa-
tions of this constant connexion have been sufficiently numerous; the ev-
idence, produced by this experience, amounts to a moral certainty.  If the 
connexion has been frequent, but not entirely uniform; the evidence 
amounts only to a probability; and is more or less probable, in proportion 
as the connexions have been more or less frequent.  
Id.at 389. 
228. Wilson said that concurrent testimonies could lead to a probability so strong 
that it was like demonstrative proof.  
 When, concerning a great number and variety of circumstances, there is 
an agreement in the testimony of many witnesses, without the possibility 
previous collusion between them, the evidence may, in its effect, be equal 
to that of strict demonstration.  That such concurrence could be the result 
of chance, is as one to infinite; or, to vary the expression, is a moral im-
possibility.   
Id. at 386. 
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proach to matters of fact came not in response to some political 
event or from a concern that jurors too often acquitted.  Instead, his 
thinking clearly followed the path lit by the Enlightenment.  The 
same standards that applied to science applied to all matters of fact 
including those disputed at a trial.  Wilson’s views indicate that 
American legal thinking in the period when the reasonable doubt 
standard emerged was greatly influenced by Enlightenment thought 
about inductive reasoning and how and when to reach the necessary 
certainty to make decisions.   
That reasonable doubt was not something devised to salve the 
consciences of conviction-reluctant jurors but a general epistemolog-
ical standard is also indicated by its second known American articu-
lation.  In the 1790 case of Cowperthwaite v. Jones
229
 the Philadel-
phia branch of the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania consid-
ered a motion for a new trial in a civil case.230  The presiding judge 
noted that the right of trial by jury required strong reasons to grant 
new trials so that judges did not replace jurors as the triers of facts.231  
The judge continued:  
 
A reasonable doubt, barely, that justice has not been 
done, especially in cases where the value or im-
portance of the cause is not great, appears to me to 
be too slender a ground for them.  But, whenever it 
appears with a reasonable certainty, that actual and 
manifest injustice is done, or that the jury have pro-
ceeded on an evident mistake, either in point of law, 
or fact, or contrary to strong evidence, or have gross-
ly misbehaved themselves, or given extravagant 




The court’s use of reasonable doubt, here, was not in a jury instruc-
tion, but was addressed to the judges themselves, and this early use 
could not have had the purpose of making convictions easier for ju-
rors fearing for their souls.  Instead, the court’s articulation was con-
  
229. 2 Dall. 55 (Pa. 1790). 
230. See generally id. 
231. Id. at 55 
232. Id. at 56. 
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sistent with the Enlightenment notion that the standard had a wide 
application for determining when a matter had been well enough 
established for a particular action to be taken.
233
 
IX. REASONABLE DOUBT AS A NEW STANDARD 
The view that reasonable doubt emerged to make convictions 
easier sees the standard as a conceptually new one.  The Boston 
Massacre trials, however, suggest otherwise and that differing for-
mulations of jury certainty were seen as equivalent. 
Justice Trowbridge mingled an in-doubt and an if-you-are-
satisfied standard.
234
  At one point, he stated, “if upon a full consid-
eration of the evidence in the case, you should be in doubt, as to any 
one of the prisoners having in fact killed either of the persons that 
were slain,” you must consider whether a defendant aided and abet-
ted another’s killing.235  He stated one soldier’s killing was justifia-
  
233. The third known use of the reasonable doubt by an American court was in a 
jury instruction.  The court in the 1793 New Jersey burglary case of State v. Wil-
son, 1 N.J.L. 439 (1793), charged the jury, “It is, however, a good rule, and it is 
also a humane rule, to which every virtuous man will assent, that where reasonable 
doubts exist, the jury, particular in capital cases, should incline to acquit rather 
than condemn.”  Id. at 442.  The standard was a compassionate one to benefit the 
accused, according to the court, not one to bring convictions in a manner to ease 
jurors’ anxieties.  Cf. id.  The instructing judge went on to say, “If you entertain 
any doubts, I do not mean doubts wantonly raised, but such as arise from a delib-
erate consideration of the testimony, these doubts should be determined in favor of 
life—the prisoner should be acquitted.”  Id. at 444.  Here, there is the any doubt 
standard, but one immediately qualified so that all doubts did not apply.  See id.  
The court does not indicate that this formulation is different from a reasonable 
doubt, but instead seems to say that a doubt has to come out of the reasoning pro-
cess, that is, that it cannot be wanton and must come from “a deliberate considera-
tion.”  Id.  The court gave no hint that this was a new standard, but suggested an-
cient roots since, according to the court, all virtuous men agree with it, indicating 
that it had existed as long as virtuous men had existed.  See generally id.   
234. John Adams equated a satisfied mind with not having a doubt.  He told the 
jury about a witness whose testimony was not corroborated, “If you can be satis-
fied in your own minds, without a doubt, that [the witness] knew McCauley so 
well as to be sure, you will believe he was there.”  See John Adams, Adams’ Ar-
gument for the Defense, in ADAMS PAPERS, supra note 26, at 261. 
235. Edmund Trowbridge, Trowbridge’s and Oliver’s Charges to the Jury, in 
ADAMS  PAPERS, supra note 26, at 292.  See also id. at 290–91 (Trowbridge stated 
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ble self-defense if the soldier’s life had been in danger and contin-
ued, “[if] you do not believe that was the case, but upon the evidence 
are satisfied” that the defendant was attacked without his life being 
in danger, then the defendant should be convicted of manslaugh-
ter.
236
  A few moments later, Trowbridge told the jury, “[i]f you are 
satisfied upon the evidence, that Killroy killed Gray, you will then 
enquire, whether it was justifiable, excusable, or felonious homicide 
. . . .”237  Thus, the jury was told that if “in doubt” that a defendant 
killed, consider aiding and abetting.  The jury was also told that if 
“satisfied” that a soldier did kill, then to decide whether the killing 
was justifiable or, if not, the degree of homicide.  Apparently, not 
being in doubt was the same as being satisfied about the evidence. 
These portions of the instruction did not explicitly clarify wheth-
er jurors were to use reason or be rational in assessing whether they 
were satisfied or in doubt, but elsewhere Trowbridge did instruct the 
jury to use reason.  He told jurors to reconcile testimony “if by any 
reasonable construction of the words it may be done.”238  He also 
told jurors that instead of concluding that contradictory evidence 
meant a witness had lied,  
if the thing said to be done be such as it may reason-
ably be supposed some might see and others not, by 
reason of their want of observation, or particular at-
tention to other matters there, as both may be true, 
you ought to suppose them to be so . . . .239
  
 
Thus, according to Trowbridge, jurors were supposed to use reason 
to see if they were satisfied by the evidence and assess whether they 
were in doubt about the facts.  Trowbridge did not say that all of the-
se tasks were the same, but he certainly did not point to any distinc-
tions among them.240 
  
that the jury could give a general verdict, “but in cases of doubt, and real difficul-
ty, the Jury ought to state the facts and circumstances in a special verdict, that the 
Court upon farther consideration thereof, may determine what the law is there-
on.”). 
236. Id. at 299. 
237. Id. at 300. 
238. Id. at 294.  
239. Id. at 294–95. 
240. See id. at 282–309. 
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Trowbridge was certainly not breaking new ground by suggest-
ing that jurors had to use reason to assess if they were satisfied that 
the evidence established guilt.  Jurors were also told that more than a 
generation earlier in the notorious New York slave conspiracy trials 
of 1741.241  There jurors were instructed that “if you should have 
sufficient reason in your own consciences to discredit [the prosecu-
tion witnesses], and that notwithstanding the weight of that evidence, 
you can think them, or any of them, not guilty, you will then say so 
and acquit them. . . .”242  The court then addressed the jury’s role in 
assessing a particularly important prosecution witness and stated that 
“if you give credit to her testimony, you will no doubt discharge a 
good conscience, and find them guilty; if you should have sufficient 
reason in your own minds to discredit her testimony, if you can think 
so, you must them acquit them . . . .”243  The notion that American 
jurors were to use reason in assessing evidence existed well before 
the 1770 proceedings. 
Justice Oliver, in the Massacre trials, of course, did explicitly 
talk about reasonable doubt, but he did not state or suggest that he 
was giving any standard different from Trowbridge’s instructions.  
Instead, as we have seen, Oliver several times indicated that he 
agreed with what Trowbridge had instructed.  If his use of reasona-
ble doubt had been intended to mean something different from what 
Trowbridge meant by a satisfied mind, being in doubt, and the use of 
reason, we might expect that Oliver would have said something ex-
plicit about the distinction. 
Finally, if Oliver was not just giving another formulation for an 
existing legal concept, but breaking with established principles and 
stating a new one that sought to aid convictions, we might expect to 
find contemporaries commenting on it at is emergence.
244
  Nothing 
in the Boston Massacre trials itself indicates that a new standard was 
being articulated, and, at least so far, no one has pointed out any ac-
count of those proceedings from that time that suggests an unprece-
  
241  THE NEW YORK CONSPIRACY TRIALS OF 1741: DANIEL HORMANDEN’S 
JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS 116–17 (Serena R. Zabin ed., 2004). 
242  Id. 
243. Id.  
244. Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 176, at 22 (“Interestingly, the Boston cases do not 
suggest that the standard was considered innovative . . . .”).  
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dented test was being argued and instructed.  Since these were not 
obscure, but closely watched trials, surely the absence of such com-
ment is noteworthy. 
X.   LESSONS FOR FINDING THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS 
A.  The Impossibility of Finding Definitive Original Meaning for an 
Evolved Right 
 
This exploration into the origins of the reasonable doubt standard 
was not undertaken to ascertain its original meaning, but for insights 
into searching for the original meaning of other constitutional crimi-
nal procedure rights.  Perhaps, the most important lesson is that 
when a right was not legislated, but evolved, finding its definitive 
original meaning is impossible.  The evolutionary steps of reasona-
ble doubt were not accompanied by explanations that might occur 
today when a statute is proposed and enacted.  We do not have cases 
from the standard’s first appearances delineating why it was being 
used.  Contemporaries did not write articles or books about its de-
velopment, and if they argued about it in court, we do not have those 
arguments.  
It is not just the lack of contemporary commentary, however, that 
is important.  Because the standard evolved, it had neither an indi-
vidual nor collective drafter.  Neither a person nor a specific body 
decided that the rule should exist.  We can look to no historical indi-
vidual or group who could have authoritatively stated the rule’s orig-
inal purpose, meaning, or intent.
245
  Professor Whitman captures an 
important point when he says about reasonable doubt that, conse-
quently, “[t]here is no original intent to interpret.  All that we can do 
  
245. See WHITMAN, supra note 27, at 210–11 (“[T]he phrase has no original 
drafter . . . . It emerged in a process of collective European rehashing of the pre-
cepts of Christian moral theology . . . . It was created not only by English jurists 
but also by English moralists—and by Italian and Spanish and French moralists 
and lawyers as well.”). 
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is try to understand the rule in its original context, which is some-
thing quite different.”246   
Comprehending this context is difficult.  To do that, we have to 
shed our present day biases, but Professor Whitman maintains that 
we are unlikely to be able to do that because we have lost touch with 
the world that produced the reasonable doubt standard.
247
  This 
thought should produce humility for those seeking original meaning 
of criminal procedure rights.  When those who have devoted their 
impressive scholarly powers to capturing the lost world that pro-
duced the standard do not agree on the original purposes for that 
rule, surely only the hubristic among the rest of us can be positive 
about what that meaning was. 
If that is true for reasonable doubt, which has produced so much 
outstanding scholarship, it is likely true for other criminal procedure 
rights.  The Framers did not create the criminal procedure rights, but 
were instead protecting already existing rights.  If the Framers indi-
cated what they thought a particular right meant, then we might be 
able to seek the original meaning of the constitutional guarantee in 
the constitutional debates.  But, since they did not, we have to turn to 
the content of the right, as it existed in the framing era.  And since 
these were evolved rights, the difficulties apparent in finding the 
original meaning and purposes for the reasonable doubt standard 
appear for the specifically enumerated constitutional guarantees. 
Such rights had neither an individual nor collective author and did 
not have an original intent to interpret.  At most, we can seek to un-
derstand their evolution in their historical context with all the diffi-
culties that entails. 
B.  Searching Beyond Legal Texts 
The reasonable doubt scholarship indicates that we can only 
grasp reasonable doubt’s development by seeing the standard’s 
emergence in the broader context of a general eighteenth century 
epistemological search for how to determine facts from human re-
  
246. Id. at 211. 
247. See id. at 209 (“We have lost touch with that old moral world. . . . The older 
morality required judges to doubt their authority to punish, demanding that they 
regard the guilty as human beings like themselves.”). 
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ports and observations.  The scholars do not agree on how the other 
disciplines affected the law, but they agree that we cannot truly un-
derstand the development of reasonable doubt merely by looking at 
judicial opinions and other legal writing.  The inquiry must be ex-
panded.  If that is true for reasonable doubt, it is also true for other 
criminal procedure rights concerned about the finding of facts from 
human actions and reports.  The search for a true understanding of 
the original meaning of such rights has to go beyond judicial opin-
ions, constitutional debates, and legal treatises into the epistemologi-
cal developments of the age. 
An example is the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”248  Even though the 





 asserted that the Confrontation Clause “is 
most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at 
common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time 
of the founding.”251  As a result the Court searched for the Confron-
tation Clause’s content by examining the law as it existed at the time 
of the framing of the Bill of Rights, and the opinion lengthily dis-
cusses English cases, and a few American cases, from that era and 
before as well as various dictionary definitions.
252
  
Confrontation is concerned with the determination of facts at tri-
al.  The reasonable doubt scholarship indicates that the legal system 
was not standing alone in seeking how to make factual determina-
tions, but that the law was part of a broader epistemological move-
ment including philosophy, science, and religion that all influenced 
  
248. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
249. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Al-
ternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995) (“The origins of the Confronta-
tion Clause are murky.  Early American documents almost never mention the 
right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers’ intent yield almost no 
information about the Clause.”). 
250. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
251. Id. at 54; see also id. at 43 (“The founding generation’s immediate source of 
the [confrontation] concept . . . was the common law.”). 
252. See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation 
Clause: Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 155 (2006), for Crawford’s use of dictionary definitions. 
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each other.  Other disciplines besides law were concerned with 
“hearsay” and “testimony” and who were proper witnesses and what 
evidence was reliable enough to form the basis for decisions.
253
  The 
scholarship about reasonable doubt’s development teaches that this 
general Enlightenment thinking needs to be studied for any true 
search into the original meaning and purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause and other criminal procedure rights concerned with finding 
facts.   
C.  American Original Meaning and English Sources 
The reasonable doubt scholarship also illustrates that we should 
not draw definitive conclusions about the original meaning of Amer-
ican criminal procedure rights from English sources.
254
  As we have 
seen, the available information indicates that the reasonable doubt 
standard emerged in America before England and that America did 
not simply adopt or inherit a standard that was first developed in 
England. 
Reasonable doubt is just another possibility illustrating that at 
least some American rights developed earlier and perhaps in differ-
ent forms from similar English procedures.  The prime example is 
the right to counsel, which was not granted in England in the eight-
eenth century, but was in America,
255





253. Barbara Shapiro’s study of the development of “facts” in diverse disciplines 
including history, science, and religion in early England finds that “suspicion of 
secondhand or hearsay reports were characteristic of all the discourses of fact.”  
SHAPIRO, supra note 39, at 161.  See also id. at 211 (“All the fact-oriented disci-
plines exhibited a preference for personal observation and a belief that the testi-
mony of credible witnesses under optimum conditions could yield believable, even 
morally certain ‘facts.’  It favored first-person accounts that made vivid the ‘facts’ 
described.”). 
254. Cf. Mark deWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 582, 583 (1939) (“[T]he historian cannot assume an explanation of American 
doctrine to be accurate simply because it is a precise and true statement of English 
theory.”). 
255. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: 
America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327 (2009) (“England did not 
permit full representation by defense attorneys until the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. In contrast, early America not only did not restrict the role of 
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The differences in American rights and procedures went beyond 
the right to counsel and knowledge of the American distinctiveness 
was not confined to the legal elite.  For example, the New York City 
newspaper The Royal Gazette
257
 published an article on October 22, 
1783, which was datelined London, August 5, and indicated it was 
reprinting an article from the Old Bailey Intelligencer.  The recycled 
English article praised a procedure in the new country.258  
 
The Americans, in adjusting their code of criminal 
law, have adopted one general rule of proceeding, 
which does honour to their humanity as well as their 
justice, which is, establishing by law the rule that no 
man shall be tried for a crime, unless he has notice 
served on him seven days previous to his trial of the 
nature of the indictment, together with the names and 
places of abode of the several witness produced to 
prove the fact.
259
   
  
defense attorneys, it guaranteed the right of counsel. It did this not only in the 
Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution, but also earlier in the state constitu-
tions after Independence -and even before the Revolution, in a number of the col-
onies.”).  
256. For example, Zephaniah Swift in his 1796 treatise about Connecticut law 
stated that the English law had been rejected in Connecticut.   
We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common 
law of England, that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused 
counsel, and denied those means of defence, which are allowed, when the 
most trifling pittance of property is in question.  The flimsy pretence, that 
the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will only heighten our indigna-
tion at the practice: for it is apparent to the least consideration, that a 
court can never furnish a person accused of the crime with the advice, and 
assistance necessary to make his defence.  
ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398–
99 (1796).  See also WILSON, supra note 86, at 702 (noting that both the United 
States and Pennsylvania granted a full right of counsel while England did not and 
stating, “This practice in England is admitted to be a hard one, and not to be very 
consonant to the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law.”).  
257. This newspaper was published by James Rivington and was preceded by 
Rivington’s New-York Gazette and Rivington’s New-York Loyal Gazette.  See 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 811 (Jackson, Kenneth T. ed. 1995). 
258. The Royal Gazette, Oct. 22, 1783. 
259. Id. 
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Obviously this framing-era writer believed that American proce-
dures and rights were not simply the same as those in England and 
that Americans at least sometimes had greater, desirable protections. 
Americans reading this article no doubt saw the same.  When a few 
years later Americans were adopting constitutional rights, surely 
they were not just incorporating narrower, less protective English 
rights than Americans already had. 
The original meaning of American rights cannot be assumed to 
be found solely in English sources when American rights developed 
in advance or independently from those in England, but this conclu-
sion only highlights the difficulty in finding the original American 
rights.  Our knowledge of what happened in eighteenth century 
American courts is so scant that it is often impossible to truly find 
that original American meaning.   
The reasonable doubt scholarship provides an important caution-
ary lesson.  Reasonable doubt is one of the rare times when we have 
a relevant and detailed early American source.  The Boston Massa-
cre trials, and their context, teach that conclusions about the stand-
ard’s development that might appear valid when only English 
sources are examined seem dubious when viewed in the American 
light.  Most often, however, we do not have good sources about early 
American criminal procedure.  That should not mean that by default 
that we rely on English sources to find the original American mean-
ing and purposes of American rights.  Instead, the lack of infor-
mation should make us humble.  Without that information, we can-
not definitively state the original American meaning of criminal pro-
cedure rights. 
 
